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SAMMENDRAG 
Gjennom vår masteroppgave har vi utforsket fenomenet akademiske spin-offs (ASOer) gjennom å 
skrive to artikler. ASOer er nyetableringer som er basert på forskning fra ulike forskningsinstitusjoner, 
som for eksempel universiteter. Å forske på ASOer er nyttig ettersom de utgjør en måte å 
kommersialisere teknologi og andre forskningsresultater. ASOer skiller seg fra andre typer startups 
ved at de har høye overlevelsesrater, men de blir sjeldent høytytende. Ettersom de tidlige fasene av en 
ASOs utvikling er karakterisert av begrensede ressurser, så har det blitt indikert av menneskelig 
kapital er spesielt viktig i utviklingen av høytytende bedrifter. Det er nettopp menneskelig kapitals 
betydning i forbindelse med ASOers ytelse som vi har utforsket i vår masteroppgave.  
 
I den første artikkelen gjorde vi et strukturert litteraturstudie for å bli kjent med litteratur som omfatter 
ASOer og ytelse. Forskningsspørsmålet vårt gikk ut på å utforske hvordan forskjellige typer 
menneskelig kapital påvirker ytelsen til ASOer. Gjennom vårt søk endte vi opp med 39 artikler som 
var relevante for vårt forskningsspørsmål. Vi identifiserte fire ulike operasjonaliseringer av 
menneskelig kapital som er mye brukt i litteraturen: arbeidserfaring, utdannelse, teamsammensetning 
og betydningen av akademiske gründeres tilstedeværelse. Ved å drøfte disse områdene kom vi fram til 
et sett med hypoteser. 
 
I den andre artikkelen tok vi utgangspunkt i funnene fra den første artikkelen, og kom fram til revidert 
sett med hypoteser. Vi ønsket å finne ut av hvordan ulike tilstedeværelsen av ulike typer menneskelig 
kapital (i form av arbeidserfaring og utdannelse) i ledelsesteamet påvirket ytelsen til ASOer. Vi ønsket 
også å utforske hvor viktig det er for ytelsen til disse bedriftene at de akademiske gründerne er med i 
ASOens ledelsesteam ved oppstart. Vi gjorde et omfattende empirisk studie for å få svar på dette. Med 
et utvalg på 100 bedrifter fra et program i regi av Forskningsrådet utførte vi regresjon, hvor vi 
operasjonaliserte ledelsesteamet ved å se på alle daglige ledere som hver enkelt bedrift har hatt, 
gjennom hele sin livstid. Våre funn indikerer, overraskende nok, at ledelsesutdanning er den type 
menneskelig kapital som har sterkest påvirkning på ytelsen til en ASO. Videre fant vi at 
ledelseserfaring også er positivt. Et annet funn som går delvis imot tidligere forskning er relatert til 
doktorgrader. Vi fant at tilstedeværelse av doktorgrader hos daglige leder har en positiv effekt på en 
ASOs ytelse. Når det gjelder den akademiske gründeren, bør akademikeren også ha kommersiell 
kunnskap for at det skal ha noe å si på ASOens ytelse.  
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ABSTRACT 
This article investigates the field of academic spin-offs. This type of spin-offs commercialize research results 
from research institutions and are believed to be a source of wealth creation. Even though academic spin-
offs have high survival rates they rarely grow into high performing ventures. Furthermore, performance of 
young academic spin-offs is closely linked to their human capital as they often have limited resources. 
Through a structured literature search we investigated how different types of human capital affect the 
performance of ASOs. A synthesis of the articles from this search indicated that four different 
operationalizations of human capital are commonly used to investigate the performance of academic spin-
offs, namely work experience, education, presence of an academic founder and team heterogeneity. We 
found indications that different types of human capital is needed in different stages of spin-off development. 
We provide a set of hypotheses that we encourage other researchers to test empirically. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Spin-off activity from universities and other 
research institutions has in the last decades seen a 
significant increase (Mustar et al., 2006, Wright et 
al., 2007a, Rothaermel et al., 2007). This is 
largely due to federal policy changes regarding 
patenting and funding as well as an emerging 
public debate about universities’ roles in society, 
which has consequently induced a change in how 
university research and activities are conducted 
(Wright et al., 2007a, Shane, 2004). The creation 
of academic spin-offs (ASOs) is a mechanism to 
transfer and commercialize knowledge from 
research institutions (Wright et al., 2007a). 
Whereas traditional emphasis has been on the 
licensing of innovations, the latter years has seen 
a popularity in transferring technology and 
knowledge through the creation of spin-offs 
(Wright et al., 2007a). Interestingly, it is seen that 
they often commercialize embryonic, early stage 
and knowledge-intensive inventions where 
existing companies fail to commercialize the 
technology (Thursby et al., 2009). Thus, the 
commercialization of technology from a 
historically non-commercial environment, has 
become an increasingly interesting topic of debate 
and research (Djokovic and Souitaris, 2008, 
Shane, 2004). 
Spin-offs from the academic environment 
are at the frontline of high-technology innovation 
and are believed to be a potential source of wealth 
and job creation. There is clear evidence that 
some spin-offs are highly successful (Shane, 
2004). However, it is found that even though 
ASOs have high survival rates, they rarely grow 
into high performing ventures, and many do not 
generate substantial wealth (Nerkar and Shane, 
2003, Wright et al., 2007a, Wright et al., 2012, 
Harrison and Leitch, 2010). 
Due to the latter, there lies great value in 
understanding how these ventures are created and 
initiated. Furthermore, one needs to comprehend 
how they differentiate in terms of resources, 
activities and development paths, and why some  
 
ASOs outperform others. This offers incentives to 
policy makers, as explaining the mechanisms 
leading to successful academic entrepreneurship 
is a crucial step in designing effective support 
mechanisms (Rasmussen, 2012, Wright et al., 
2007a). 
ASOs face distinct challenges that are 
related to characteristics of the university/research 
environment and the nature of the technology 
itself; ASOs are characterised by knowledge-
intensive, novel and potentially disruptive 
technologies involving high levels of tacit 
knowledge residing within the academic founders 
(Ardichvili et al., 2003). They commonly operate 
in uncertain environments (Roure and Keeley, 
1990, Vohora et al., 2004). Consequently, 
development paths are long and complex and 
requires a combination of competencies that are 
outside the scope of the research institutions’ core 
activities (Vohora et al., 2004). Firms with 
technologies at such early stage often face 
difficulties gaining investments as capital 
providers find the business opportunity hard to 
evaluate (Wright et al., 2006). Furthermore, the 
non-commercial environment of universities and 
research institutions suggests that the academic 
entrepreneur(s) is unlikely to have experience or 
skills in commercialising business ideas (Mosey 
and Wright, 2007). Lastly, opposing interests 
between key stakeholders such as the university, 
the founders, management team and providers of 
finance are likely to hamper the spin-off 
development. Hence, there is a conflict between 
research and commercial activities (Mustar et al., 
2006, Rasmussen, 2011).  
The performance of spin-offs is among 
other things related to type and amount of human 
capital of the individuals involved. Human capital 
relates to skills and knowledge derived from 
education and experience and it is generally 
believed that higher levels of human capital is 
positively linked to enhanced performance of 
ASOs (Shane, 2004, Davidsson and Honig, 2003, 
Colombo and Grilli, 2005, Becker, 1964, Mosey 
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and Wright, 2007). Human capital criteria appears 
to be especially useful for predicting success and 
long term survival while spin-offs are young 
(Unger et al., 2011, Aspelund et al., 2005). 
Moreover, early strategic decisions have lasting 
effects and impacts the spin-offs long term 
performance (Bamford et al., 2000).  
One major drawback of human capital 
studies is the lack of empirical and longitudinal 
data (Rothaermel et al., 2007, Hayter, 2013). As a 
consequence, most studies on performance are 
static, and overlook dynamic characteristics and 
their development over time (Vohora et al., 2004, 
Druilhe and Garnsey, 2004). This is argued to be 
a significant limitation as performance and 
success is dependent on several variables. 
Furthermore, looking at these variables by taking 
a snapshot at a particular point in time is a 
weakness (Hayter, 2011). In particular there is a 
need for literature emphasizing early development 
of spin-offs and how human capital influences 
this (Davidsson and Honig, 2003).  
Furthermore, most studies on human 
capital and success draw on literature about new 
technology based firms (NTBF). Although 
NTBFs and ASOs are closely related, we would 
argue that the ASO context and its related 
challenges mentioned earlier is of particular 
interest when studying human capital measures.  
In this literature review, we will attempt 
to uncover what types of human capital the 
founder(s) need in the development of a 
successful ASO. In particular we choose to focus 
on how investments of human capital; namely 
education and work experience of the academic 
entrepreneur(s) affects the performance of ASOs. 
We chose to focus on how human capital in 
earlier stages predict future success, as this is the 
time when human capital is the most influential in 
terms of which path the venture evolves (Clarysse 
and Moray, 2004). In other words, the initial base 
of human capital is valuable in determining the 
long term survival of spin-offs (Aspelund et al., 
2005). By using process related theories we seek 
to find out what types of human capital are 
especially helpful in selected junctures, or critical 
waypoints of spin-off development. Unlike other 
studies which measure firm performance by 
taking a snapshot in time, we treat spin-off 
performance as a longitudinal process that 
develops over time. Consequently, when treating 
spin-off development as a range of different 
phases, the influence of the different kinds of 
human capital is expected to vary across the 
phases (Vohora et al., 2004). As follows, the 
research question in this study is:  
How do different types of human capital 
affect the performance of ASOs?  
Our study contributes to the 
understanding of the ASO phenomenon while 
suggesting what human capital needs are 
prominent through the different phases of ASO 
development. Awareness of what types of human 
capital an ASO needs in order to perform should 
be of interest to universities, technology transfer 
offices (TTOs), scholars, policymakers and 
academics themselves as it may increase the 
chances of successful spin-off development.  
The article is structured as follows: First, 
we explore the theoretical foundation of our topic 
and provide definitions relevant for the research 
question. The Resource Based Theory (RBT) is 
chosen as theoretical lens as it is closely related to 
human capital and the performance of ASOs. The 
Knowledge Based View (KBV) is also presented 
as knowledge is a key component of human 
capital. Additionally we give a brief presentation 
of the ASO phenomenon as well as a theoretical 
perspective which looks at spin-off development 
as a process. Second, the method used in the 
structured literature review is thoroughly 
explained. Third, an analysis of the literature is 
performed providing descriptive statistics and 
demographic information. The following 
discussion extracts relevant theory on human 
capital and performance and a set of related 
hypothesis is put forward. Finally, implications, 
limitations, further research and a conclusion are 
provided.  
2. THEORETICAL 
BACKGROUND  
In order understand why we arrived at our 
research question we believe it necessary to build 
a theoretical foundation which explains concepts 
closely related to human capital, success and 
process. There is also a need to establish some 
fundamental definitions so terms like ASOs, 
process, success and performance are not 
misinterpreted. The following section will first 
give a brief introduction to RBT and KBV. 
Secondly we will investigate the phenomenon of 
ASOs by defining the unit of analysis (ASO), 
outline research on performance as well as giving 
an introduction to a process view of ASOs.  
2.1 Resource Based Theory 
The RBT has become a commonly used 
framework to explain why some firms perform 
better than others (Mustar et al., 2006). The 
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theory attributes a firm’s superior performance to 
the firm’s organisational resources and 
capabilities. Arguably it is a suitable framework 
to explain how human capital influences 
performance of ASOs and in understanding 
entrepreneurial processes (Aspelund et al., 2005). 
RBT helps to evaluate all the different 
resources a firm possesses and contextualise how 
they can be used to achieve sustained competitive 
advantage and maximise rents (Grant, 1991, 
Barney, 1991). According to Barney (1991) the 
resources that will help a firm obtain a sustained 
competitive advantage needs to be: Valuable, 
rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable (VRIN-
framework). A valuable resource enables the firm 
to improve its market position compared to its 
competitors (Peteraf, 1993). Rare resources 
enables the firm to keep a sustained competitive 
advantage and are difficult to obtain for 
competitors (Barney, 1991). Resources that are 
inimitable refers to resources that are immobile 
and costly to imitate or replicate (Barney, 1991). 
Finally, non-substitutable resources result in a 
sustained competitive advantage and cannot be 
substituted by other resources in order to 
implement the same strategy (Barney, 1991). 
RBT also includes a description of the 
term capabilities, defined by Makadok and 
Barney (2001) as “an organizationally embedded 
non-transferable firm-specific resource whose 
purpose is to improve the productivity of the other 
resources possessed by the firm”. There is an 
important distinction between resources and 
capabilities, where the former is the basic unit of 
analysis for the firm whereas the latter is the 
capacity of bundled resources to perform an 
organisational task or activity (Grant, 1991). 
Capabilities are what the firm does better and/or 
more efficiently compared to its competitors 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Grant (1991) 
states that capabilities are not formed simply by 
bundling resources as the process of turning 
resources into capabilities includes coordination 
and complex interactions. This transformation 
from resources to capabilities is in itself a 
resource (Grant, 1991).  
In 1997 Teece et al. made a distinction 
between different capabilities. They differentiated 
between current capabilities (referred to as 
substantive capabilities (Grant, 1991)) and 
dynamic capabilities. The dynamic capabilities of 
a firm explain how certain firms can stay 
competitive over time (Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2000). Teece et al. (1997) defined dynamic 
capabilities as “the firm’s ability to integrate, 
build, and reconfigure internal and external 
competences to address rapidly changing 
environments”. Dynamic capabilities are 
especially important in rapidly changing markets 
where the ability to create new resource 
configurations and capabilities are crucial to 
gaining and maintaining a competitive advantage 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). This is indeed the 
case of ASOs and other high tech firms, as they 
operate in such markets. Hence, dynamic 
capabilities are just as important to ASOs as other 
firms striving for competitive advantage (Ittner 
and Larcker, 1997).  
2.1.1 Resource based theory and new 
ventures 
The RBT framework as defined in 1991 by 
Barney (1991) had some shortcomings when it 
came to explaining how entrepreneurs with 
limited resources and no organisation to speak of 
could build sustained competitive advantages. 
Alvarez and Busenitz (2001) used RBT to show 
how entrepreneurs use their unique awareness of 
opportunities, their ability to acquire the resources 
needed to exploit these opportunities, as well as 
the organizational ability to combine 
homogeneous resources into heterogeneous 
resources and thus obtain a sustained competitive 
advantage. Brush et al. (2001) explains this 
differently: “Initial focus must rest on the 
resources of the entrepreneur and not the firm”. 
This serves to show that the construction of the 
initial resource base is the true entrepreneurial 
challenge (Brush et al., 2001). Gurdon and 
Samsom (2010) built on how RBT could be used 
to explain entrepreneurial traits. As they stated, 
using the VRIN-framework as well as the 
entrepreneurs’ personal characteristics; their drive 
to achieve and sense of self-efficacy should be 
viewed as important resources and placed in the 
impossible to imitate category in the VRIN-
framework (Gurdon and Samsom, 2010). This 
entails that the entrepreneurs personal traits, their 
ability to acquire resources and combine them are 
in themselves resources that can be the basis of a 
sustained competitive advantage (Alvarez and 
Busenitz, 2001).  
Advocates of the resource based 
perspective describe a multitude of resource 
categories but there is a lack of consensus on how 
to classify them (Brush et al., 1997). Most of 
these typologies are suited well established firms, 
not considering the fact that resources of new 
firms are scarce and need to be acquired and 
developed before turning valuable (Rasmussen et 
al., 2011). To account for this, Brush et al. (2001) 
therefore defined six categories of resources 
suited for new ventures, namely technological, 
human, social, financial, physical and 
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organisational resources. Mustar et al. (2006) 
further developed these into categories suited for 
the context of ASOs, namely; technological, 
social, human, and financial. 
Technological resources; defined as the 
firm-specific products and technology. For new 
ventures the degree of innovation, scope of their 
technology, legitimacy of the firms’ research and 
development (R&D) and where they are in the 
product development cycle also impact their 
technological resources (Borch et al., 1999).  
Social resources; consist of the firm’s 
industry and financial contacts, in other words, 
the outcome of network relationships (Brush et 
al., 2001). 
Financial resources; the type and amount 
of financing of the firm, meaning all the different 
types of financial resources that a firm can 
possess and use (Heirman and Clarysse, 2004). 
Human capital; defined as the stock of 
knowledge and skills that resides within 
individuals (Becker, 1964). According to RBT 
human capital resources are a potential source of 
competitive advantage as they may be valuable, 
inimitable, rare and non-substitutable (Zhuang 
and Lederer, 2006). According to research, the 
initial competencies of new ventures basically 
coincide with the competencies or the human 
capital of the founders. Arguably, understanding 
human capital is paramount when trying to 
understand the performance of new firms (Mustar 
et al., 2006, Cooper and Bruno, 1977). 
For this article it is important to note that 
because skills and knowledge are difficult to 
measure, most researchers use human capital 
investments, such as education and work 
experience, as proxies for human capital (Unger 
et al., 2011). This is a necessary, but also valid 
approach as there is a strong relationship between 
these human capital investments and their 
potential outcomes (skills and knowledge). 
Hence, having technical education or experience 
implies you have technical skills (Unger et al., 
2011).  
2.1.2 Knowledge Based View 
KBV is an extension to RBT and is based on the 
assumption that knowledge is the firm’s key 
resource (Lockett et al., 2005). As spin-offs from 
universities often commercialize early stage and 
knowledge-intensive inventions (Thursby et al., 
2009), the KBV is suited for studying spin-offs 
from an academic environment.  
Knowledge is a particular type of 
resource with three important dynamic traits 
separating it from all other resources; (i) It can 
grow stronger when used, (ii) It is never lost when 
shared, and (iii) It is independent of factors such 
as space and time (Widding, 2005). Lockett et al. 
(2005) suggest that spin-offs can potentially 
enhance their performance through accessing, 
developing, and integrating new and existing 
knowledge. Knowledge is closely related to 
skills/capabilities as it is seen as the key input into 
the development of these capabilities (Lockett et 
al., 2005). As seen previously, capabilities 
represent what a firm does better or more 
efficiently compared to competitors (Eisenhardt 
and Martin, 2000), which serves to illustrate the 
importance of knowledge and knowledge 
management in ASOs.  
Furthermore, knowledge can be described 
as explicit or tacit. Explicit knowledge, or 
codifiable knowledge, can easily be stored or 
transferred between individuals. In 
entrepreneurial ventures it can be assumed that 
explicit knowledge is underdeveloped for several 
reasons: (i) There are few employees, which 
makes it difficult to specialize functions (ii) There 
is often a high pace of activity which may 
interfere with the documentation of tasks and 
routines (iii) There is a low level of formalization 
(Widding, 2003). Tacit knowledge is non-
transferable and non-storable other than in the 
person it originated from. Thus, tacit knowledge 
is highly individual. However, Polanyi (1967) 
argues that all knowledge is either tacit or rooted 
in tacit knowledge, thus implying that all 
knowledge relies on the person or people where it 
originated from. Some of the most valuable 
aspects of an organization are embedded in its 
tacit knowledge, as such knowledge is hard to 
imitate and sell (Amit and Belcourt, 1999).  
One of the challenges a new firm faces is 
to set in place a structure that allows the firm to 
capture and store the entrepreneur's tacit 
knowledge as the venture grows (Brush et al., 
2001), thus making tacit knowledge explicit. 
Failure to do so may hamper growth and 
performance. Alexander et al. (1991) argues that 
not all facts and procedures containing tacit 
knowledge can become explicit, whereas others 
can be elevated to a level of consciousness at 
some particular point or for some specific task. 
Although tacit knowledge is hard to formalize and 
communicate to others, it can be achieved by 
participating in an activity for a longer period of 
time (Widding, 2003). In the section below an 
introduction to the ASO phenomenon is 
presented. 
 
 
6 
2.2 The phenomenon of academic 
spin-offs 
An academic, or research based spin-off has the 
distinct feature of being initiated inside the 
university or research institution (Rasmussen, 
2011), and is a mechanism to transfer technology 
and commercialize inventions originating from 
these institutions (Shane, 2004). This has become 
an international phenomenon and has stimulated 
the discussion among scholars and policy makers 
as to whether and how spin-offs generate wealth 
(Mustar et al., 2006, Clarysse et al., 2005, Wright 
et al., 2007a).  
 In contrast to established firms, spin-off 
firms tend to commercialize radical and early 
stage technologies which represents major 
advances in a particular field of research (Shane, 
2004). It often has a strong intellectual property 
(IP) protection and is typically built on the tacit 
knowledge of the founders. In terms of industry, 
biotechnology is where most research based spin-
offs occur, followed by computer software 
(Shane, 2004). While this is especially the case 
for the US context, similar patterns are seen 
across Europe. Due to the nature and type of 
technology and the issue of stemming from a non-
commercial environment, academic innovations 
typically have longer development times (Shane, 
2004). Furthermore, it is also seen that ASOs tend 
to remain rather small (Harrison and Leitch, 
2010). This could be due to the multiple 
challenges faced by research based spin-offs. 
Understanding how these challenges affect the 
spin-off creation and development process and 
how they can be overcome is thus fundamental to 
be able to generate wealth (Wright et al., 2007a). 
This has led to researchers increasingly 
recognising the fact that spin-offs are complex 
and heterogeneous and depend on the context in 
which they occur (Mustar et al., 2006). 
ASOs have historically been a US 
phenomenon and a great share of the literature 
stem from a small number of highly successful 
research institutions in the US (Wright et al., 
2007a, O'Shea et al., 2005, Rothaermel et al., 
2007). This context is unlike most research 
environments in Europe and therefore the spin-off 
process is likely to be different. Because of 
various factors, such as university and 
governmental policies, availability of financing as 
well as social norms, the US is in general better 
than Europe at transforming research into 
innovations (Wright et al., 2007a).  
2.2.1 Defining an academic spin-off 
University, or academic, spin-offs are defined in a 
number of different ways. The employment of an 
imprecise and vague definition may have 
disadvantageous effects on academic 
entrepreneurship research, as scholars are likely to 
use the same term even though they describe 
different situations and phenomena (Pirnay et al., 
2003). Even the word “spin-off”, used to describe 
a university spin-off is a matter of discussion, 
where terms such as spin-off, spinouts and start-
ups are frequently used (Carayannis et al., 1998).  
Even though definitions differ greatly, 
there are still a number of common elements, such 
as the object being defined (research based, 
university, academic), the founders, and how 
knowledge is transferred. Djokovic and Souitaris 
(2008) states that the “definition of a USO should 
specify the ‘outcome’ of the spin-out process, the 
essential ‘parties’ involved in it, and the ‘core 
elements’ that are transferred (spun-out) during 
that process.” The definition of an ASO should 
include the same elements to leave no room for 
ambiguity. Table 1 presents some of the most 
used definitions and their characteristics.  
It is clear from the definitions above that 
the outcome of the spin-off process is firm 
formation. However, based on Djokovic and 
Souitaris (2008) there are still some dimensions 
used in these definitions that need clarification; 
Technology transfer, institutions and founders. 
These dimensions will be treated before the 
definition used in this article is presented.  
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The term technology transfer is defined 
by Eto et al. (1995): “Technology is information 
that is put to use in order to accomplish some 
task. Transfer is the movement of technology via 
some channel from one individual or organization 
to another”. Gibson and Rogers (1994) combines 
the two by saying that technology transfer is the 
application of knowledge, meaning taking ideas 
and products from the research laboratory across 
organizational boundaries into commercial 
applications. This definition of technology 
transfer does not explicitly touch upon the topic 
of IP rights. Thus, definitions using concepts such 
as technology transfer or technology based ideas 
may consist of patents or licensing as well as 
informal transferring of technology. In fact, 
Wright et al. (2007a) defines university spin-offs 
to be new ventures that are dependent upon either 
licensing or the delegation of an institution’s IP. 
Accordingly, the focus is on the IP that is being 
transferred into the spin-off, excluding tacit 
knowledge and technology that cannot be 
patented. However, IP is not always owned by the 
university and many companies are not built upon 
“formal, codified knowledge embodied in 
patents” (Wright et al., 2007a). Focusing on IP 
would only include a subgroup of university or 
research based spin-offs.  
Smilor et al. (1990) states that a 
university spin-off is based on a technology or 
technology-based idea developed within the 
university. As they avoid to specify what a 
“technology or technology-based idea” consists 
of, it may include patents, licensing and 
knowledge of a more tacit nature (informal).  
According to Rogers et al. (1999) and 
Nicolaou and Birley (2003) a spin-off is founded 
around a “core technology”. The “core 
technology” being transferred is not specified, and 
may consist of either formal (such as IP and 
licenses) or more informal knowledge (tacit).  
The definitions used by Clarysse and 
Heirman (2000) and Pirnay et al. (2003) have less 
focus on technology. Clarysse and Heirman 
(2000) defines research based spin-offs as an 
entity that commercialized transferred inventions, 
whereas Pirnay et al. (2003) are slightly more 
specific in their definition by describing 
university spin-offs as “New firms created to 
exploit commercially some knowledge, 
technology or research results”. An invention can 
be either technology, IP or a non-technical idea. 
By using the words knowledge, technology and 
research result, it opens up for the possibility to 
define a new company based on a university 
canteen-recipe as a spin-off. The spin-offs in both 
these definitions can accordingly have a very 
broad focus with an offering that is not 
necessarily related to technology.  
Defined by Definition 
of 
Definition 
Smilor et al. 
(1990) 
University 
spin-out 
(i) The founder was a faculty member, staff member, or student who left 
the university to start a company or started the company while still 
affiliated with the university; and/or (ii) a technology or technology-based 
idea developed within the university was used to start the company. 
Rogers et al. 
(2001)  
Spin-off  A spin-off is a new company that is formed (i) by individuals who were 
former employees of a parent organization, and (ii) with a core technology 
that is transferred from a parent organization (Hashimoto et al., 1997) 
Nicolaou and 
Birley (2003) 
University 
spinouts 
(i) The transfer of a core technology from an academic institution into a 
new company. (ii) The founding member(s) may include the inventor 
academic(s) who may or may not be currently affiliated with the academic 
institution. 
Clarysse and 
Heirman (2000)  
Research 
based spin-
offs 
New companies set up by a host institute (university, technical school, 
public/private R&D department) to transfer and commercialize inventions 
resulting from the R&D efforts of the departments.  
Pirnay et al. 
(2003)  
University 
spin-off 
New firms created to exploit commercially some knowledge, technology 
or research results developed within a university. 
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Unit and institution: There are notable 
differences in the definitions with regards to the 
institution where the spin-off spins out from. 
Smilor et al. (1990) and Pirnay et al. (2003) 
specify that their defined university spin-off 
comes from the university. The institution in 
Nicolaou and Birley (2003)’s definition of 
university spinouts is an “academic institution”, 
thus including research facilities such as 
university-based research centers as well as 
private research centers. Rogers et al. (2001) 
institution is simply a “parent organization”, 
which can be just about anything, including for 
instance an established firm. Finally, Clarysse and 
Heirman (2000) defines research based spin-offs 
to spin out from an institute (university, technical 
school, public/private R&D department). This 
definition explicitly includes both private and 
public research institutions. 
Founders: Mainly three aspects of the 
founders’ roles appear in definitions: whether or 
not the inventor founds the spin-off, the founder’s 
affiliation to the spin-off institution, and finally, 
what type of occupation they have (for instance 
staff, academics, researchers and students).  
Radosevich (1995) makes a distinction 
between the inventor-entrepreneur and a 
surrogate entrepreneur. The former implies that 
the inventor founds the spin-off, while the latter is 
the case when an entrepreneur, not originally 
affiliated with the technology, founds the spin-off 
(with the technology developed in the parent 
organisation). Only Rogers et al. (2001) states that 
the spin-off must be formed by former employees 
of the parent organization. Their definition does 
not specify whether the founder(s) must be the 
inventor-academic, yet the definition implies this. 
Neither Clarysse and Heirman (2000) nor Pirnay 
et al. (2003) specify who the founders of the spin-
off must be, and are thus open for both inventor-
entrepreneurs and surrogate entrepreneurs. Smilor 
et al. (1990) and Nicolaou and Birley (2003) both 
open up for the possibility of founders that are not 
affiliated with the “parent organization” (i.e 
surrogate entrepreneurs).  
Another element of the founders’ role is 
their affiliation to the spin-off institution. In 
essence, this relates to whether or not the founders 
have to quit their current work to start the spin-
off. The definitions that are studied have three 
possible outcomes; The first type of definition 
explicitly states that the founders have to leave 
the parent organization. Definitions of Rogers et 
al. (2001) and Smilor et al. (1990) are in this 
category. The second option is that the founder 
can choose to continue his or her work at the 
institution in question, at the same time as 
founding the spin-off. Only Nicolaou and Birley 
(2003) explicitly states that this is an option. The 
final possibility is a definition that does not 
specify whether the founder can still work at the 
institute or not. As neither Clarysse and Heirman 
(2000) nor Pirnay et al. (2003) mention who 
founds the spin-off, they both fall under this 
category.  
The last element of the definitions 
focuses on the nature of the founders’ role at the 
institution. Neither Rogers et al. (2001), Clarysse 
and Heirman (2000) nor Pirnay et al. (2003) 
specify this. Nicolaou and Birley (2003) states 
that the founder has to be the “inventor 
academic(s)”. This includes faculty, researchers 
and graduates, but excludes staff. The definition 
by Smilor et al. (1990) is quite different, and 
states that the founder can be a faculty member, 
staff member, or student. This definition is quite 
general, and makes it possible to classify a staff 
member leaving the university to start a catering 
business to be classified as a university spin-off 
(as long as there is some technology related to the 
business). 
Definition of an ASO: As seen above, 
definitions differ significantly. With regards to the 
technology being transferred, some of the 
definitions specify that some kind of technology, 
technology-based idea or core technology is 
transferred, whereas others are more open as to 
what can be transferred. We choose to leave this 
more open and thus side with the latter group, 
which opens up for the possibility of early stage 
research results being commercialised. 
 With regards to the unit and institution 
used the definitions diverge. The unit is naturally 
related to the institution. We choose to define this 
as a host institution. While this definition includes 
other institutions than universities, it is important 
to notice that the context may be quite different. 
A private research institution might be more 
restrictive than a university when it comes to 
transferring knowledge to a spin-off company. It 
is likely that they wish to reduce the risk 
associated with the spin-off process, as their 
objective is to produce applied research. The 
university’s objective is to serve public benefit, 
and may transfer knowledge to a spin-off earlier 
in the process.  
Furthermore, we will define an academic 
spin-off. Defining the institution to be a host 
institution naturally excludes the possibility of 
using the term “university spin-off”. Using the 
word academic emphasizes the focus on the 
academic nature of the host institution, and is 
chosen for this reason.  
The role of the founders in the spin-off 
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diverges in the different definitions, where some 
demand that the founders quit their current 
affiliation with the institution, whereas others 
either do not specify it or explicitly opens up for 
the possibility of a surrogate entrepreneur to 
found the spin-off. In our definition we explicitly 
open up the possibility for the whole range, as 
surrogate entrepreneurship is also receiving 
considerable attention in entrepreneurship 
literature (Franklin et al., 2001). 
Our definition of an ASO is as follows, 
using a combination of Nicolaou and Birley 
(2003), Pirnay et al. (2003) and Clarysse and 
Heirman (2000); An academic spin-off (ASO) is 
defined as “ (i) The transfer of some knowledge, 
technology or research result from a host institute 
(university, technical school, public/private R&D 
department) into a new company. (ii) The 
founding member(s) may include the inventor 
academic(s) who may or may not be currently 
affiliated with the host institution.”  
2.2.2 The performance of academic spin-
offs  
As this article is built on literature addressing the 
relation between human capital and performance, 
we believe it necessary to present the concept of 
performance of ASOs. A review of the literature 
shows that the aspect of success and performance 
is well addressed. However, as Rasmussen (2012) 
and Hayter (2011) points out there is limited 
consensus on the unit of analysis and which 
measures to use when seeking to find a definition. 
Scholars tend to choose measures that are easily 
accessible or measurable, or whichever measure 
that fits the purpose of their study.  
 The majority of definitions consist of one 
dimensional measures related to the performance 
of the venture. The benefit of using such data is 
that they are relatively accessible and can be 
measured objectively and quantitatively. Authors 
frequently use criteria like sales growth, 
profitability and growth in terms of job creation 
(Clarysse et al., 2011, Colombo and Grilli, 2010). 
Others measure success as having an initial public 
offering (Walter et al., 2011, Shane, 2004), 
having attracted early stage financing or Venture 
Capital (VC) (Shane and Toby, 2002, Wright et 
al., 2007a), in number of patents and scientific 
papers (Zucker et al., 2002), speed to market 
(Clarysse and Heirman, 2000) or simply just 
remaining in business (Shane and Toby, 2002).  
Rather than focusing on pure 
performance, a stream of literature, highlighted by 
Hayter (2011), looks at success as something 
defined from the viewpoint of the academic 
entrepreneur or shareholders, resulting in a 
number of subjective and interrelated definitions 
including technology diffusion, personal 
development, personal financial gain, social well 
being and peer motivations (Gurdon and Samsom, 
2010, Hayter, 2011, Franklin et al., 2001). This 
will include those spin-offs that may still be 
viewed as successful by those involved, despite 
having a weak financial performance. In the case 
of ASOs there is empirical evidence of conflicting 
interests between key stakeholders such as the 
university, the venture management and the 
entrepreneurs. This causes a shared focus between 
spin-off activity and research activity, and thus a 
weaker financial performance (Rasmussen, 2011, 
Mustar et al., 2006). 
Most of the above measures are used as 
proxies that predicts success, as spin-offs may 
take several years to develop into sustainable 
ventures (Lawton Smith and Ho, 2006). 
Attracting venture financing, for example, implies 
that investors assess the spin-off as a potential 
future success and is thus an intermediary 
measure of success (Rasmussen, 2012).  
As a note to the reader, we do not 
discriminate between the different definitions and 
will include articles with all definitions in our 
literature review and discussion.  
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2.2.3 A process view of academic spin-off 
development 
In order to understand the reasons why some 
ASOs outperform others it is necessary to 
understand how they develop and the difficulties 
they face. Thus, performance is a process-
dependent output of ASO development.  
Several researches have sought to explain 
how ASOs evolve using different life-cycle 
models (Wright et al., 2012, Vohora et al., 2004, 
van Geenhuizen and Soetanto, 2009, Rasmussen 
et al., 2011, Hindle and Yencken, 2004, Donato et 
al., 2011, Clarysse and Moray, 2004, Ambos and 
Birkinshaw, 2010). Life-cycle models are suited 
for a process view centered on human capital as 
they focus on how the ASO progresses from 
initial to later stages. However, such theories fail 
to explain how the venture moves from one phase 
to the next (Rasmussen, 2011).  
The work of Vohora et al. (2004) has 
been used by many authors (Lockett et al., 2005, 
Lawton Smith and Ho, 2006, Mustar et al., 2006, 
van Geenhuizen and Soetanto, 2009). It is one of 
the few models that looks at ASOs in particular 
and  
 
 
 
 
describes the process they go through. The model 
explains how an ASO progresses through five 
phases in an iterative and non-linear way, each 
phase being separated by a critical juncture. The 
junctures are characterised by several challenges 
the ASO has to surpass in order to move forward. 
These challenges are overcome by developing 
resources and dynamic capabilities (Vohora et al., 
2004). These phases and junctures will be 
presented briefly (based on (Wright et al., 2007a) 
and (Vohora et al., 2004)). Figure 1 displays how 
ASOs transition through the phases and critical 
junctures.  
In the research phase the IP is created, 
which again provides the opportunity for 
commercialization. To succeed to the opportunity 
framing phase the ASO must pass the opportunity 
recognition juncture where the main challenge is 
to offer the necessary solution to satisfy an 
unfulfilled market need (Bhave, 1994). The ASO 
moves from having recognized an opportunity 
and takes the formative steps needed to create a 
new venture. These steps mainly focus on the 
academic and the TTO. Furthermore, the 
entrepreneurial commitment junction arises due to 
the need of committing a venture champion to a 
certain course of events. Failure to pass this 
juncture arises when the need for such 
FIGURE 1 - FROM VOHORA ET AL. (2004) - "THE CRITICAL JUNCTURES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
UNIVERSITY SPIN-OUT COMPANIES". 
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commitment is there, yet the venture fails to find 
someone with the necessary entrepreneurial 
capabilities. The juncture is followed by the pre-
organization phase, in which management can 
develop and start to implement the strategic plans. 
Early decisions are crucial for the ASO’s 
development, which emphasizes the usefulness of 
accessing human capital, prior entrepreneurial 
experience as well as networks of expertise 
(Wright et al., 2007a). Next, the venture 
credibility juncture must be overcome. Acquiring 
the necessary resources to be able to execute the 
business plan and form the entrepreneurial team is 
challenging. Credibility is necessary in order to 
convince customers and investors. In the 
reorientation phase the entrepreneurs try to 
generate returns, but face challenges in 
reconfiguring resources after having identified, 
acquired and integrated them. For those ventures 
that reach this phase, a learning effect was 
identified, as the academic entrepreneurs identify 
how to develop resources, knowledge and 
information and subsequently assemble new 
capabilities. The last juncture to pass through is 
the venture sustainability juncture in which there 
is a need to continuously reconfigure resources, 
capabilities and social capital according to new 
information, resources and knowledge. 
Deficiencies from earlier phases may at this point 
be too difficult to resolve, resulting in the inability 
to progress past the critical juncture. The ASOs 
that pass this juncture reach the final phase of 
sustainable returns. The ASO achieves 
sustainable returns and the entrepreneurial team 
focuses on acquiring and re-configuring resources 
as the development of capabilities is necessary to 
reach and stay successfully this phase.  
 Critique may be raised against Vohora et 
al.’s model. Vohora et al. (2004) claim the model 
is nonlinear while it is only the revisiting of 
earlier phases that gives the model nonlinearity. 
Furthermore, there is no explanation of the time 
aspect and how long the ASOs stays in each phase 
or juncture. Additionally, it views ASOs as a 
homogeneous group as it assumes that the 
academic inventors take part in the spin-off 
activity. Finally, as Vohora et al. (2004) based the 
model on cases of only seven ASOs, it can be 
argued that this is a very limited number to 
generalize from, as Vohora et al. (2004) are the 
first to point out. Despite the critique against the 
model it is still a valuable framework for looking 
at the process of ASO development as it explains 
how the ASO will face different resource needs at 
different points in it its development. Vohora et 
al.’s model will be used to link human capital 
needs through the process of ASO development. 
3. METHOD 
A structured literature review was performed with 
the aim of identifying how different human 
capital factors affect ASO performance. This 
allows us to understand previous work relating to 
the topic, the different definitions used by 
scholars, literature gaps and issues being debated. 
Reputable literature reviews of the ASO 
phenomenon from Rothaermel et al. (2007), 
Mustar et al. (2006) and Rasmussen (2012) 
formed the basis for an initial understanding of 
the field of ASOs. The reviews also served as a 
brief orientation to previous work. In order to 
accommodate for apparent gaps in the ASO 
literature, the search method was set up to include 
the larger and more explored field of NTBFs. 
ASO can be regarded as a subgroup of NTBFs, as 
they are both technology based, however ASOs 
are bound by the points discussed in chapter 2.2.4. 
The literature review consisted of four 
stages. In the first stage a structured search in the 
ISI database was performed. In the second and 
third stage the articles were evaluated and reduced 
according to a set of criteria. Reversed 
snowballing was used on the remaining articles, 
to create a more robust literature search. Finally 
the remaining articles were rated and some 
irrelevant articles were discarded. Each of the 
stages are explained in detail below. Figure 2 
displays the number of articles left after each 
stage. 
The first stage consisted of a structured 
search using the extensive ISI Web of Knowledge 
database. This database includes leading journals 
from a broad range of publishers relevant for our 
research question. Three types of search terms 
were included in the search. First, search terms 
relating to the nature of the firm such as variations 
of NTBFs and ASOs were employed. Secondly, 
different search terms for “spin-off” were used. 
Finally, variations of “success” and “failure” were 
included. Variations for the first two search term 
FIGURE 2 - OVERVIEW OF STAGES AND ARTICLES 
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types were retrieved from Rasmussen (2012). The 
search words were used to search both title and 
abstract. The search word and search syntax can 
be found in appendix 1.  
We chose to screen the literature based 
publishing journals. This is an effective way to 
exclude irrelevant areas of research that may 
include similar search terms. The selection of 
journals was based on the research conducted by 
Rasmussen (2012). In this way reputable journals 
relevant for research literature on ASOs and 
NTBFs were included in the search. Table 2 
displays the selected publication sources. This 
automatic screening resulted in 880 articles. 
The second stage consisted of screening 
articles by title. Articles that pertained to other 
scientific fields that were outside the scope of this 
paper were filtered out. Such articles were 
typically articles that did not look at NTBFs or 
ASOs and/or some performance variable. For 
example, titles including words such as family 
innovation, family firms, corporations and so on 
were removed. This reduced the number of 
articles down to 441.  
 
The third stage consisted of a detailed 
review of abstracts. The following three criteria 
formed the basis of elimination: 
1. Wrong unit of analysis; Articles analysing 
anything different from the firm itself and its 
performance and growth were removed. 
Articles that were removed treated subjects 
such as university policies, industry and 
corporate policies. 
2. Focus on aspects outside the scope of this 
article; Articles related to how human capital 
affects a NTBF or ASO and/or how a company 
can manage its resources in order to survive 
and/or grow were kept. For instance, articles 
focusing on internationalization and emerging 
economies were omitted.  
3. Not adhering to our definitions; Articles 
clearly not focusing on NTBFs, ASOs, ASO 
and success/failure were removed. For 
example, articles focusing on larger 
corporations were excluded.  
After the third screening stage 56 articles were 
left to review and rate. Combinations of the first 
two criteria were the main drivers for the drastic 
reduction.  
In the fourth stage the process of reversed 
snowballing was performed (Streeton et al., 
2004). This method uncovered articles that were 
relevant for the research question and not 
included in the articles left from the third stage. 
The reference list of every article was checked in 
order to make sure that relevant cited articles 
were included in the structured search. Relevant 
articles not included in the search were 
subsequently added. Finally, ten articles were 
added to the initial 56, resulting in a sample of 66 
articles. 
Of the ten articles added in the reverse 
snowballing, six of the articles were published in 
publications deemed relevant, however they did 
not include the chosen search words. The 
common theme for these articles was human 
Publication name 
Research Policy  Academy of management 
journal 
Journal of Business 
Venturing 
Management Science 
Journal of Technology 
transfer  
Strategic Management 
journal 
Technovation R & D Management 
Small Business 
Economics 
Industrial and Corporate 
change 
Administrative science 
quarterly 
Entrepreneurship theory 
and practice 
Academy of 
management review 
Organization science  
TABLE 2 - CHOSEN PUBLICATIONS 
TABLE 3 - RELEVANCE OF THE ARTICLES 
Importance of the article for 
the research question 
Criteria for relevance: Number of articles: 
High The article illuminates a large or central part of the 
research question. 
19 
Medium The article gives insight into parts or adjacent topics 
relevant for this article. 
20 
Low The article has little relevant information for this paper. 27 
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capital’s effect on new ventures, thus not focusing 
on performance or success/failure but effect. The 
last four articles did include relevant search words 
but were published in publications that were 
automatically filtered before stage one. The first 
six revealed a limitation in the search that will be 
discussed in section 7 limitations and further 
research. The discovery of the last four articles is 
a typical advantage of the reversed snowballing 
method.  
Every article read was rated on the basis 
of how relevant/important it was for this article 
based the criteria explained in table 3. As 
displayed in table 3, 27 articles were of little 
relevance. These were eliminated, and we ended 
up with 39 articles that were used. 
4. RESULTS  
By analysing the 39 articles we are able to 
provide the reader with an overview of interesting 
descriptive statistics. The section below will 
graphically present the share of articles with 
ASOs as the unit of analysis, provide an overview 
of the journals where the articles were published, 
present which countries the data is collected from 
and provide some considerations related to the 
nationality of authors. Lastly, we will present the 
abundance of key topics relevant to the research 
question.   
Unit of analysis: The majority of the 
articles focus on NTBFs as opposed to ASOs. 
Figure 3 displays the distribution of articles 
focusing on either NTBFs or ASOs. As pointed 
out by Rothaermel et al. (2007) and Rasmussen 
(2012) and, as illustrated by figure 3, there is a 
lack of literature focusing purely on ASOs. As a 
matter of fact, only 27% of the 39 articles focused 
on ASOs.  
 Publishing sources: The main publishing 
sources are displayed in figure 4. Four journals 
have been identified as the main publishing 
sources for the field relating to NTBF/ASO and 
success/failure. Furthermore, these four journals 
published 70% of the articles. 
Origin of data: Figure 5 shows which 
countries the data used in the studies originate 
from. Most of the studies (28) collect data from a 
single country, whereas five of the studies collect 
data from several. The rest of the articles (six) 
were literature reviews. As expected, studying 
data from the US is by far the most common. This 
is linked to the fact that spin-off activity in 
academic environments is more developed in the 
US compared to Europe (Wright et al., 2007a).  
Origin of authors: Mike Wright has 
authored or co-authored 6 articles (15%), which is 
twice as many as the second largest contributors 
(Massimo Colombo, Luca Grilli and Donald 
Siegel). Furthermore, 4 authors (Deniz 
Ucbasaran, Matthew Marvel, Simon Mosey and 
Enrico Santarelli) have authored or co-authored 
two articles each. The rest of the authors, which 
amount to 77, have only written one article each, 
indicating that scholars contribute with only one 
article before they move on to a different field of 
study. However, this can also indicate that some 
authors do not hold research as their main 
occupation. Furthermore, it can be remarked that 
among the eight authors that have published more 
than one article, only two are American, while 
three from come the UK and three from Italy. 
This indicates that a field of study which has 
historically been a US phenomenon appears to be 
changing. Moreover, it may indicate that research 
environments within the field of human capital 
are in the process of getting established in the UK 
and Italy. However, as indicated by figure 5, most 
of the data used in the articles still originate from 
the US. 
FIGURE 3 - DISTRIBUTION OF ARTICLES TREATING 
NTBFS AND ASOS 
FIGURE 4 - OVERVIEW OVER JOURNALS AND 
PUBLICATION FREQUENCY 
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Key findings: A review of the articles and their 
key findings is found in appendix 2. As a result of 
the review we identified four different 
operationalizations of human capital that were 
recurrent in the articles. These four independent 
variables may affect ASO performance. A 
description of these operationalizations is found 
in table 4, and the distribution is displayed in 
figure 6. 
 In general many authors investigated 
work experience (87%) and education (62%) and 
their effect on the performance of ASOs. The 
presence of an academic founder was a topic in 
18% of the articles, and team heterogeneity was 
only a topic in 15%.  
Furthermore, VC has been used in several 
studies as an operationalization of performance. 
In fact, 23% of the articles investigated relations 
between VC, human capital and performance. 
Additionally, 30% of the articles had a process 
orientation to their studies and focused on the 
early stages of ASO development. Even though 
we focus on human capital variables, we will 
touch upon the topics of VC and a process view in 
the discussion.  
To summarize, we see that few articles 
investigate the relation between ASOs and 
performance. As anticipated, most scholars study 
NTBFs. Secondly, we see indications that the 
field of study of human capital is changing away 
from being a US phenomenon. Finally, we found 
that some operationalizations of human capital 
that are recurrent in the literature that was 
reviewed.  
This article will explore work experience 
and education in connection with the other topics 
as presented in figure 6, thus developing a 
comprehensive view on human capital elements 
that affect ASO performance. 
5. DISCUSSION 
Researchers generally believe that higher levels of 
human capital is positively linked to ASO 
performance (Shane, 2004, Davidsson and Honig, 
2003, Colombo and Grilli, 2005, Becker, 1964, 
Mosey and Wright, 2007). Higher levels of 
human capital (in the form of education and 
experience) is linked to being more productive 
than comparable employees. In the case of ASOs, 
where the need for problem solving and the 
ability to adapt to changing environments is 
essential, such individuals prove to be especially 
Education If the founder, entrepreneur or 
entrepreneurial team’s education 
was evaluated.  
Work 
experience 
If the founder, entrepreneur or 
entrepreneurial team’s work 
experience was evaluated.  
Academic 
founder 
If it is explicitly stated that the 
academic founder was assessed. 
Team 
composition 
If team heterogeneity was 
regarded 
FIGURE 6 - OCCURRENCE OF RECURRENT 
OPERATIONALIZATIONS OF HUMAN CAPITAL 
TABLE 4 - OPERATIONALIZATIONS OF HUMAN 
CAPITAL 
FIGURE 5 - COUNTRIES DATA ORIGINATE FROM 
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useful (Bartel and Lichtenberg, 1987, Siegel, 
1999, Siegel et al., 1997). 
As previously mentioned, most authors 
look at education and work experience and argue 
that the various elements differ in how significant 
they are in predicting the performance of ASOs 
(Cooper et al., 1994, Unger et al., 2011, Wright et 
al., 2007b). Some also propose that various 
elements, in particular experience, are more 
important in various stages of spin-off 
development. Vohora et al. (2004)’s phase based 
model will be used to link these human capital 
elements to ASO development in the discussion. 
The focus will be on the opportunity recognition 
and credibility junctures. The second and fourth 
junctures, relating to commitment and 
sustainability, are thus left out. The former will 
not be emphasised as it relates more to the 
mindset of the “venture champion” rather than the 
type of experience this champion possesses. The 
latter is omitted as findings indicate that human 
capital indicators are insufficient as predictors of 
performance in later phases (Davidsson and 
Honig, 2003). Other factors present in the 
sustainability juncture, such as the choice of 
growth strategy, will impact human capital needs, 
indicating that human capital effects will become 
difficult to measure (Davidsson and Honig, 2003). 
Accordingly, the importance of human capital 
elements will be hard to generalise for the 
sustainability juncture.  
A discussion of the reviewed literature on 
human capital and performance follows. The 
discussion will follow the same themes as 
indicated in section 4. First, we will look at how 
different types of work experiences impact ASO 
performance, and, where possible, how they differ 
in importance through junctures of spin-off 
development. Secondly, considerations on 
education’s effect on performance will be treated. 
Arguably, education and work experience are 
closely related. However, the main knowledge 
type acquired from these differ; while explicit 
knowledge is the key component learned from 
education, tacit knowledge is gained through 
experience (Davidsson and Honig, 2003). 
Furthermore, type of education has largely been 
neglected in previous studies (Colombo and 
Grilli, 2005), and a review of this topic may lead 
to novel insights. For these reasons we have 
chosen to treat education separately. Thirdly, 
team composition and cognitive complementarity 
will be treated by looking at how different types 
of work experience and education could be 
combined. Finally, it will be examined if the 
academic founders’ participation in the ASO will 
influence ASO performance. This comprehensive 
treatment of human capital will help us answer 
our research question: How do different types of 
human capital affect the performance of ASOs? 
5.1 Work experience and 
performance of spin-offs 
The following section assesses work experience 
and its effect on performance. In line with other 
scholars, we treat the types that are believed to be 
relevant for the ASO setting; Managerial, 
commercial, technical and entrepreneurial 
experience (Ganotakis, 2012, Gimmon, 2010, 
Ucbasaran et al., 2008, Wright et al., 2007b). 
Although some of the categories may overlap, 
they arguably cover most skills that may help an 
entrepreneur in developing a performing spin-off. 
The four types are covered below. 
5.1.1 Managerial work experience  
In terms of occupational experience, scholars 
often assume that skills derived from managerial 
experience, meaning experience on how to 
manage and run companies including how to 
make complex strategic decisions and managing 
people, has positive effect on the performance of 
ASOs (Ucbasaran et al., 2008, Aspelund et al., 
2005, Ganotakis, 2012, Santarelli and Hien Thu, 
2013). As pointed out by Shane (2004), most 
academic founders do not have managerial 
experience and those who succeed are the ones 
that realize and recognise the fact that they need 
people in the business function of the company. 
Considering the fast moving environments with 
short product life-cycles that many high-tech 
firms operate in, management is a greater 
challenge than in many other environments 
(Ucbasaran et al., 2008). Hence, having people 
with experience in leading and coordinating the 
business efforts of a firm is expected to be useful. 
Additionally, managerial experience may foster 
the ability to see means-end relationships more 
clearly than those without this experience (Gaglio 
and Katz, 2001). Lastly, entrepreneurs with higher 
levels of managerial experience may be more 
responsive in terms of converting an idea to an 
opportunity (Ardichvili et al., 2003). In line with 
the above, successful entrepreneurs interviewed 
by Gurdon and Samsom (2010) specifically 
mentioned the importance of a team with 
management skills as researchers tend to play 
down the importance of business activities.  
Colombo and Grilli (2010), Gurdon and 
Samsom (2010) and Gimmon (2010) also found a 
large and direct effect of number of years in 
managerial roles and ASOs’ growth, implying 
that excellent managerial skills is a matter of 
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practice and experience rather that an academic 
talent. Moreover, these authors connect 
managerial experience with increased likelihood 
of receiving VC funding. On the one hand, VCs 
look for firms with high quality management 
teams and are drawn towards entrepreneurs with 
managerial experience, as they are more likely to 
successfully run a company. As a result of the 
investment, the venture is more likely to become a 
sustainable success (Colombo and Grilli, 2010). 
On the other hand, managerial experience implies 
the ability to run the ASO, administer its 
resources as well as doing what is necessary to 
secure external funding. Consequently, in cases 
where the entrepreneurial team lacks managerial 
experience, VCs usually replace the CEO with an 
experienced manager. This means that managerial 
experience leads to ASO growth both directly (as 
a result of skills) and indirectly (mediated by VC 
investment which in turn leads to growth).  
From a process perspective, gaining 
external financing is one of the proxies for having 
reached venture credibility (Vohora et al., 2004), 
meaning the presence of managerial experience is 
helpful in passing this juncture. 
In contrast to the above arguments, 
Davidsson and Honig (2003) reported that 
managerial experience failed to demonstrate a 
significant effect on opportunity discovery and 
exploitation. They argue that managerial 
experience may foster procedures and routines 
that do not stimulate effective resource allocation 
at an early stage. Based on these findings, one 
could argue that managerial experience is more 
vital in the later stages of a spin-off development 
process and at the time when the venture prepares 
for growth (Wright et al., 2007b, Ucbasaran et al., 
2008).  
Overall, the literature favours the 
presence of managerial experience in an 
entrepreneurial team. It is especially important in 
terms of gaining venture credibility and external 
financing as well as in later stages of growth. 
Some authors have argued that managerial 
experience is of lesser importance in the earlier 
stages related to opportunity recognition. The 
following hypothesis is put forward:  
 
1a. Managerial work experience among founders 
has a positive effect on academic spin-off 
performance. It has a positive effect on 
overcoming the venture credibility juncture.  
5.2.2 Technical work experience  
Technical experience relates to the experience in 
engineering, research and development or 
manufacturing (Ganotakis, 2012). The effects of 
this type of human capital are found to be 
especially important in firms based on technology 
(Unger et al., 2011, Kirzner, 1997, Utterback, 
1996, Shrader and Siegel, 2007). Authors 
highlight that among the different types of human 
capital, tacit knowledge from technical experience 
is believed to be one of the most critical types for 
ASOs (Shrader and Siegel, 2007, Knockaert et al., 
2011). High technology based firms are known to 
be operating in dynamic, rapidly changing 
markets, meaning flexibility and the ability to 
create new products that are suited customer 
needs is of great importance (Ittner and Larcker, 
1997, Unger et al., 2011). Accordingly, technical 
experience is suggested to be a fundamental part 
of ASO development, as an ASO’s product 
offering is typically built upon the tacit 
knowledge of inventors/researchers and the 
transfer of such knowledge (Lowe, 2006, Carlile 
and Rebentisch, 2003). Hence, many argue that 
technological experience will help sustain 
competitive advantage as well as reduce the risks 
and costs related to development (Ucbasaran et 
al., 2008, Park, 2005). 
Even though technical experience is 
expected to be positive to a firm's success, many 
authors highlight that technical experience must 
be complemented with other non-technical 
experience, such as managerial or commercial 
experience (Kakati, 2003, Oakey, 2003, 
Ganotakis, 2012, Gurdon and Samsom, 2010, 
Aspelund et al., 2005). An overemphasis on the 
technological side may lead to the lack of 
attention to commercial aspects of the ASO 
(Kakati, 2003). Shrader and Siegel (2007) argues 
that technical experienced individuals may 
overestimate one's skills and the potential of the 
technology, leading to negative development of 
the spin-off. Kakati (2003) follows by suggesting 
that once the product has overcome the 
prototyping phase and enjoys some protection, 
focus should be shifted away from technology 
efforts and balanced with commercial and 
business activities.  
The above arguments suggest that 
technical experience is of lesser importance in 
later phases. However, it is especially important 
in the earlier phases of spin-off development as it 
reduces the risk and cost of product development 
(Ucbasaran et al., 2008). Additionally, as spin-
offs often commercialize very early stage, 
embryonic and radical technologies (Shane, 2004, 
Thursby et al., 2009), where the application is not 
evident, technical experienced entrepreneurs will 
be able to understand the technology’s potential 
and limitations. In relation to the process model of 
Vohora’s et al. (2004) we suggest that technical 
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experience is of importance in the opportunity 
recognition juncture as it involves matching 
knowledge of the technology with a commercial 
application. Based on the above section, the 
following hypotheses are put forward; 
  
1c: Technical work experience among founders 
has a positive effect on academic spin-off 
performance. It has a positive effect on 
overcoming the opportunity recognition juncture.  
1d: Technical work experience in combination 
with managerial or commercial work experience 
among founders has a stronger positive effect on 
academic spin-off performance compared to 
having technical work experience alone. 
5.2.3 Commercial work experience 
Commercial experience relates to previous 
employment with marketing and sales related 
tasks, as well as contact with customers, suppliers 
and manufacturers. The term “commercial” is 
often used interchangeably with industry 
experience, which may or may not give rise to 
commercial experience.  
Commercial experience (including 
commercial industry experience) is of value for 
several reasons; Firstly, it enhances 
entrepreneurs’ ability to recognise opportunities 
in unserved markets and the commercial value of 
a technology. Secondly, it can help identify 
markets where the product or technology will be 
radically different to competitors, thus increasing 
competitive advantage, Lastly, it enhances an 
entrepreneur's ability to interact with customers, 
distributors and industry partners (Aspelund et al., 
2005, Shane, 2000, Park, 2005, Marvel and 
Lumpkin, 2007, Shrader and Siegel, 2007, 
Marvel, 2013). The latter is partly due to an 
extended network from previous employments. 
Moreover, Heirman and Clarysse (2004) argues 
that commercial experience is positive to growth 
as it brings confidence and knowledge of 
managing risks in a particular market. 
Additionally, it signalizes credibility to investors, 
thus increasing chances of getting VC (Heirman 
and Clarysse, 2004). 
As seen, commercial experience is 
generally reported to have positive effects on the 
performance of ASOs, though in line with what is 
written in the previous section, commercial 
experience will not perform ideally on its own, 
but should be complemented with technical 
experience (Wright et al., 2007b, Ganotakis, 
2012, Colombo and Grilli, 2005). This enhances 
the entrepreneurs ability to understand and 
communicate how the product or technology can 
be tailored to fit customer needs. This will in turn 
aid the founding team in recognising the best 
market opportunities for the technology 
(Knockaert et al., 2011, Ganotakis, 2012). 
Arguably, ASOs in the opportunity recognition 
juncture will greatly benefit from having 
commercial experience on the team.  
 
1e: Commercial work experience among founders 
has a positive effect on academic spin-off 
performance. It has a positive effect on 
overcoming the opportunity recognition juncture.  
1f: Commercial work experience in combination 
with technical work experience among founders 
has a stronger positive effect on academic spin-off 
performance compared to having commercial 
experience alone.  
5.2.4 Entrepreneurial work experience 
Entrepreneurial experience is referred to as start-
up experience and business ownership experience, 
and is generally believed to be positively linked to 
the performance of ASOs (Davidsson and Honig, 
2003, Ucbasaran et al., 2008, Mosey and Wright, 
2007, Colombo and Grilli, 2005). Two aspects are 
highlighted; The value of access to external 
human capital gained through networks and the 
benefit of direct learning from episodic skills 
about the entrepreneurial process (tacit 
knowledge). Prior start-up management is also a 
strong human capital signal to investors and 
thereby increases the chances of obtaining VC 
(Colombo and Grilli, 2005, Hsu, 2007). Shane 
(2004) argues that credibility (and funding) is 
gained more swiftly among people with 
entrepreneurial experience because they have 
developed an extensive network from previous 
entrepreneurial activity. Interestingly, there are 
also some findings suggesting that entrepreneurial 
activities have a negative relationship to 
generated profit. This is attributed to the 
likelihood of second time entrepreneurs being 
more cautious to the riskiness of ASOs. Second 
time entrepreneurs are likely to become 
overconfident and adopt strategies and routines 
that have worked in the past rather than making 
new ones.  
Entrepreneurial experience has as such 
produced divergent results when it comes to 
performance outcomes, but overall, the view of 
entrepreneurial experience being positive to 
performance dominate. The following hypothesis 
is proposed:  
 
1g: Entrepreneurial work experience among 
founders has a positive effect on academic spin-
off performance. It has a positive effect on 
overcoming the venture credibility juncture  
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5.3 Education and performance 
Two themes treating education and its effect on 
ASO performance is found to be recurrent in the 
literature review. Firstly, a recent stream of 
literature (Colombo and Grilli, 2005, Gimmon, 
2010) focuses on how the type of education of 
entrepreneurs may affect ASO performance. 
Secondly, several authors have investigated how 
the level of education may have an impact on 
performance. Hence, the type and level of 
education will be treated in this section.  
5.3.1 Type of education 
Skills useful for entrepreneurs may be gained in 
education through the accumulation of explicit 
knowledge (Davidsson and Honig, 2003), and it is 
arguably interesting to investigate the effect of 
education on ASO performance. In fact, formal 
education is one component of human capital that 
has proved to give nonlinear and inconsistent 
effects of performance, growth and the 
exploitation of opportunities (Avermaete et al., 
2004, Stuart and Abetti, 1990, Haber and Reichel, 
2007, Davidsson and Honig, 2003, Bosma et al., 
2004, Mayer-Haug et al., 2013).  
Several studies (Davidsson and Honig, 
2003, Mayer-Haug et al., 2013, Ucbasaran et al., 
2008) have focused on general education by 
investigating how the level of education of the 
entrepreneurs affect firm survival or growth. 
However, the type of education has largely been 
neglected (Colombo and Grilli, 2005). In recent 
years some studies have focused on types of 
education that are found to be more relevant for 
an ASO setting, most often business, managerial, 
economic and technical/scientific education (for 
example (Colombo and Grilli, 2005, Gimmon, 
2010)). Research regarding the effect of these 
education types on performance has produced 
somewhat divergent results.  
Colombo and Grilli (2009) found a 
significant and positive effect of economic and 
managerial university education and to a lesser 
extent technical and scientific education on ASO 
growth and survival. The former is supported by 
both Oakey (2003) and Ganotakis (2012). 
Furthermore, Colombo and Grilli (2010) found 
that managerial and economic education has a 
positive effect on the likelihood of receiving VC 
funding, thus also affecting performance 
indirectly (see 5.1.1). With regards to technical 
education, Ganotakis (2012) found it had a 
significant and negative effect on performance. 
However, the findings also indicated that when a 
technical education was combined with 
commercial experience in an entrepreneurial team 
the negative effects from technical education 
alone were reversed. 
As seen the relation between education 
and performance produce divergent results. 
Business-related education types appear to have a 
positive effect on ASO performance, both directly 
and indirectly, whereas results have been more 
contradictory with regards to technical education. 
As seen in 5.2.2, technical work experience is 
expected to have a positive effect on ASO 
performance. Furthermore, the tacit knowledge of 
the researchers and transfer of this was seen as a 
fundamental part of ASO development (Lowe, 
2006, Carlile and Rebentisch, 2003). Accordingly, 
technical education alone (without technical work 
experience) may have a negative impact on ASO 
performance because the person in question lacks 
tacit knowledge (gained through work experience) 
relevant for further development of the invention, 
and because such education may have to be very 
specific for the ASO in question in order for it to 
be a predictor of performance. The following 
hypotheses are put forward:  
 
2a: Managerial education among founders has a 
positive effect on academic spin-off performance. 
2b: Technical education alone among founders 
(meaning founders with education and no work 
experience) has a negative effect on academic 
spin-off performance.  
Where managerial education is used as a 
collective term for business, managerial and 
economic education.  
5.3.2 Level of education 
Recent studies give support to a reversed U-
shaped relationship between education and ASO 
performance (Oakey, 2003, Ganotakis, 2012, 
Unger et al., 2011). These studies suggest that 
individuals with very high levels of general 
education may not be able to turn their human 
capital into performance as they might adopt self-
righteous attitudes, overestimate their abilities and 
perceive their present skills to be sufficient to 
pursue a successful spin-off. This may prevent 
them from seeking additional information that 
could have led to either new opportunities, better 
decisions or valuable contacts (Ucbasaran et al., 
2008). In addition to adverse personality 
characteristics of highly educated, findings 
indicated that such people are more likely to want 
to stay in control of their ASOs, potentially 
threatening long term survival. Additionally, it 
may be that highly academic people are more 
oriented towards research (Roberts and Malonet, 
1996).  
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Ganotakis (2012) and Unger et al. (2011) 
explain the reversed U-shaped relationship 
differently by proposing that very high education 
(assumably above masters) may be an indicator of 
higher age, a family, a desire to do research and a 
higher perceived opportunity cost of venturing, 
thus affecting performance indirectly. 
Furthermore, Gimmon (2010) found that high 
academic status among founders was not 
positively related to ASO survival.  
Summed up, studies give strong 
indications that entrepreneurs with a PhD degree 
affects the performance of ASO in a negative 
manner, and we thus put forward the following 
hypothesis: 
 
2c: General education is expected to have a 
reversed U-shaped relationship to academic spin-
off performance where low (below a bachelors 
degree) and high (above a master degree) levels 
of general education have a negative effect on 
academic spin-off performance.  
Where general education refers to all types of 
education.  
5.4 Team heterogeneity and 
cognitive distance  
Several researchers emphasize the importance of 
complementary skills within entrepreneurial 
teams (Knockaert et al., 2011, Ganotakis, 2012, 
Kakati, 2003, Oakey, 2003, Gurdon and Samsom, 
2010, Aspelund et al., 2005). Specifically, the 
presence of cognitive heterogeneity/cognitive 
distance (where cognitive distance relates to 
difference between individuals’ reference frames, 
skills and experience) will trigger team members 
to challenge each others’ views and opinions 
which ultimately leads to better strategy decisions 
(Wright et al., 2007b). Furthermore, it allows 
team members to extend and bridge their shared 
knowledge (Nooteboom et al., 2007). Too large 
cognitive distance, however, is expected to 
adversely affect performance; suggesting that 
cognitive and performance exhibit an inverted u-
shaped relationship (Nooteboom et al., 2007). 
As already indicated by the hypotheses, 
the coexistence of commercial (or managerial) 
experience and technical experience proves to be 
especially important in ASOs (Ganotakis, 2012, 
Knockaert et al., 2011, Colombo and Grilli, 2005, 
Kakati, 2003). In terms of technical education, the 
coexistence of commercial experience may 
reverse the negative effects from technical 
education alone. Compared to other coexistences, 
the combination of technical and commercial 
experience is what scholars tend to highlight the 
most. 
Entrepreneurs in ASOs often possess rich 
amounts of technical experience, but usually lack 
commercial experience, meaning such knowledge 
has to be acquired from outside of the founding 
team. This leads to the occurrence of a 
“knowledge gap” which is rooted in the cognitive 
distance between technical and commercial roles 
in the founding team (Knockaert et al., 2011, 
Wright et al., 2007b). Consequently, the 
introduction of any commercial person in the 
ASO may not be sufficient to fill the knowledge 
gap: On the one hand, the commercial person may 
not be able to communicate and understand the 
technology, leading to the inability of finding 
suitable market applications and serving customer 
demands. On the other hand, technical people 
with no commercial knowledge are less likely to 
understand how the market impacts the product 
development. Similar to Knockaert et al. (2011), 
we propose that there should be some overlap in 
cognitive maps so that effective knowledge 
sharing and coherent understanding of the 
technology, marketing strategies and the product 
development can take place. In particular this 
means that in an ideal ASO founding team, the 
technical responsible person has some 
commercial experience and the commercial 
responsible person has some technical experience, 
or technical education (as presented by 
(Ganotakis, 2012)). Based on the above, the 
following hypothesis is put forward; 
3a: In the presence of complementary skills 
among founders, overlaps in cognitive maps will 
enhance the performance of the academic spin-
off. 
5.5 Presence of academic founder 
Most inventions are at an early stage when a spin-
off is established (Shane, 2004). Furthermore, 
they tend to be of tacit nature, and the tacit 
knowledge that underlies these inventions makes 
it paramount that the academic founder is 
involved in the spin-off development (Shane, 
2004).  
Since all knowledge is either tacit or 
rooted in tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1967) the 
argument presented by Shane (2004) should be 
valid for other types of technology transfer and 
not exclusively for inventions. Knockaert et al. 
(2010) found that the transfer of tacit knowledge 
is more inclined to be successful if the scientists 
who worked with the invention is part of the 
entrepreneurial team, regardless if the product or 
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technology is mainly based on explicit 
knowledge. In fact, spin-offs with the academic 
founder present are found to be less likely to fail 
(Nerkar and Shane, 2003), further indicating that 
having an academic founder affects success 
positively.  
 As seen previously, an overemphasis on 
the technical side may lead to the development of 
products that fail to serve markets appropriately 
(Kakati, 2003). Several authors Lockett et al. 
(2003), Daniels and Hofer (1993), Vohora et al. 
(2004) and Rasmussen et al. (2011) suggest that 
academic founders lack commercial experience or 
knowledge needed to understand the commercial 
environment surrounding the ASO. Thus, 
academic founders may have difficulties in 
finding an attractive market where the technology 
can satisfy a real consumer need (Vohora et al., 
2004). Particularly, potential commercial 
applications may be easier to see for academic 
founders with industrial experience (Rasmussen et 
al., 2011). In fact, Knockaert et al. (2010) found 
that a top management team with both tacit 
knowledge about the technology as well as 
commercial knowledge/mindset will increase the 
spin-offs performance as the speed to market 
increases. However, a limitation was that the 
cognitive distance between the academic founder 
and the person with commercial knowledge or 
mindset must not be too large.  
As seen above it seems likely that having 
the academic inventor(s) as founder(s) (called 
academic founders) of an ASO will increase the 
performance of the ASO. However, a distinction 
should be made with regards to the nature of the 
technology being commercialized and whether 
tacit or explicit components of knowledge are 
emphasized. The following hypothesis is 
proposed:  
 
4a: Active academic founders present in the 
entrepreneurial team at inception of an academic 
spin-off will have a positive effect on academic 
spin-off performance. The effect will be stronger 
if the main knowledge component of the 
technology, invention or research result is of tacit 
nature as opposed to explicit.  
 
Where active academic founder refers to a person: 
(i) Who was part of the research team behind the 
technology, invention or research result being 
commercialised (ii) Who is actively involved in 
the daily operations of the ASO.  
6. CONCLUSION 
This article investigates how different types of 
human capital, operationalized through education 
and work experience, affect the performance of 
academic spin-offs. We treat spin-off 
development as a process and take a process view 
into account when addressing human capital 
needs. Our contribution has been to provide a 
state of the art review of existing literature and to 
synthesize this into hypotheses that can be tested 
in empirical studies. By doing so, we have 
answered our research question: How do different 
types of human capital affect the performance of 
ASOs? Specifically we have focused on linking 
human capital needs to various stages in the ASO 
development and argued that different kinds of 
human capital are needed at each juncture. For 
example, technical experience seems to be 
necessary in the earliest stages of spin-off 
development, whereas managerial experience is 
essential in later phases of spin-off development. 
Overall, we found that experience affects 
performance positively, even more so if the 
founding team is equipped with complementary 
skills. Education however, has produced 
inconsistent and generally weak effects on 
performance, with the exception of managerial 
education.  
The research question should be of 
interest to scholars, practitioners and policy 
makers as research shows that spin-offs rarely 
develop into high-performing ventures (Wright et 
al., 2007b). Thus there is a need to understand the 
mechanisms behind ASO development and how 
effective support mechanisms can be designed. 
Based on our findings we present a number of 
implications for practitioners and policy makers.  
Considering the TTOs role as 
commercialisation agents, they should be aware 
of the fact that ASOs go through several phases 
with different challenges. To overcome these 
challenges the human capital needs will differ, 
depending on the phase the ASO is in. More 
specifically, TTOs should acknowledge the value 
of coexistence of commercial and technical 
experience and aid academic entrepreneurs in 
finding people that can serve as the commercial 
counterpart in the team.  
Providers of financial advice and funding 
should be made aware that technical skills are not 
sufficient to ensure sustainable spin-offs. In line 
with the above, such skills should be 
complemented with commercial or managerial 
skills. As ASOs originate from a non-commercial 
environment, some of these skills are likely to be 
absent at spin-off initiation, but are arguably very 
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important to be able to find a suitable market for 
the business idea.  
 Lastly, we make a suggestion related to 
technical and science-based PhD-programs, 
research based and technical education. As 
successful spin-off activity requires 
complementary non-technical skills, research 
institutions and technical schools should consider 
to provide training in such skills. Furthermore, we 
advise such institutions to adopt an increased 
focus on how one may commercialize research 
and pursue opportunities as this is believed to 
both enhance spin-off activity and increase the 
share of successful spin-offs.  
7. LIMITATIONS AND 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
Several elements may impact our findings. 
Limitations and possibilities of further research 
will be presented.  
Hypotheses testing: The hypothesis 
derived from the literature review should be tested 
quantitatively. As our literature review draws on 
research from both ASOs and NTBFs as well as 
research from different types of spin-off contexts, 
it is likely that not all hypotheses will be 
supported or be valid for all types of spin-offs. 
This in line with Wright et al. (2007a), who points 
out that the context of the ASO influences how 
they develop and perform. Testing the hypotheses 
on real life cases will contribute to theory 
building on the ASO phenomenon.  
Learning: Measuring the outcome (skills 
and knowledge) of a human capital investment 
(education and experience), in other words 
learning, is a challenge as it may, or may not, lead 
to knowledge and skills (Unger et al., 2011). In 
this paper we have assumed that experience and 
education results in knowledge or skills, as 
supported by literature (Unger et al., 2011). 
Measurement of the relation between a human 
capital investment and actual knowledge and 
skills should be looked further into, as it is 
probable that even people with comparable 
experience and education process this in different 
ways, resulting in diverging knowledge and skills 
(Quinones et al., 1995). 
Influence of personality traits: Another 
issue related to human capital that might influence 
(the outcome of) human capital is grounded in 
studies related to psychology. The personality 
traits of the involved actors may affect our 
findings. As Ganotakis (2012) points out, high 
technical education may lead to or correlate with 
some personality traits that have adverse effects 
on the performance of the spin-off. Furthermore, 
some skills may be a result of personality traits 
rather than a result of education or experience. 
Entrepreneurial skills is suggested to partly be 
such a trait. The relation between skills and 
experience as well as the relation between 
personality traits and skills should be further 
researched.  
Team composition and heterogeneity: 
Another concern relates to the composition of the 
entrepreneurial team. As shown by Wright et al. 
(2007b), cognitive heterogeneity may be vital for 
team members to challenge each other, ultimately 
ending up with a superior strategy for the ASO. 
Wright et al. (2007b) argue that when expanding 
the entrepreneurial team, current members are 
often inclined to appoint new members that are 
cognitively alike and have similar views on doing 
business. Arguably, there is a chance that the new 
members’ skills will not see their full potential 
and that skills in the team are overlapping. 
Furthermore, Knockaert et al. (2011) argues that 
the cognitive distance between founding members 
should not be too large as it may inhibit the 
effective transfer of knowledge. How personality 
traits, cognitive distance, team composition and 
team dynamics can mediate the knowledge and 
skills of these people is an area for further 
research.  
Literature context: This literature review 
has focused on ASOs, yet several of the articles 
reviewed have focused on other objects such as 
research based spin-offs and NTBFs. This is 
something that may affect our findings as we 
generalize this to apply to ASOs. However, as 
ASOs are a subset of NTBFs, it may be that the 
effects of this are negligible. Furthermore, since 
we have supplemented with specific literature for 
ASOs and academic founders we argue that this 
effect is minimized.  
Industry influence: ASOs can span a 
variety of industries. It is possible that industry 
differences may affect the human capital needs of 
an ASO as well as their effect on performance. 
For example, the resources required by firms in 
biotechnology may be quite distinct from those 
needed by software firms. One would also expect 
the timescale and phases over which these 
resources may be needed are very different 
(Mustar et al., 2006). However, Roure and Keeley 
(1990) found that industry differences do not 
affect ASOs’ performance. Others again have 
looked at differences between high-tech and low-
tech industries, and found that there is no 
difference of human capital effects between the 
two (Unger et al., 2011). A further investigation 
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of how industry affects human capital needs is 
warranted.  
Method: As with any method, our method 
has both strengths and weaknesses. A trade-off is 
made between the scope and the time spent 
reviewing literature. Drawbacks of the methods 
used in this paper are highlighted below;  
1. The scope of discarded articles may have 
been wider than indicated in the titles and 
abstracts. This may have affected our 
search since in the first two stages we 
only filtered based on title and title and 
abstract. 
2. The search does not capture all the 
relevant literature as we only searched in 
a limited number of journals and with a 
defined set of keywords that may not be 
optimal. The search would be improved 
by doing a separate search based on the 
effects of human capital on new ASOs. 
These terms were not included in our 
search. However, most of these articles 
are likely to be registered through the 
other search words and through reversed 
snowballing.  
3. Our search does not capture recently 
published works that are outside the 
scope of the structured search (but still 
possibly relevant) as reversed 
snowballing only tracks older articles.  
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EDFNJURXQGDQGH[SHULHQFHEHLQJUHODWHGWRLQQRYDWLRQ)XUWKHUPRUHWKH\
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FROODERUDWLRQZLWKUHVHDUFKLQVLWXWLRQVDQGFXVWRPHUV
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H[SHULHQFH
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HQWUHSUHQHXULDOSHUIRUPDQFH"
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RIILUPIRXQGHUV
)RXQGWKDWVSHFLILFLQYHVWPHQWVRIILUPIRXQGHUVLQKXPDQRUVRFLDOFDSLWDO
HQKDQFHWKHLUSHUIRUPDQFH+RZHYHUZLWKRXWIXUWKHUH[SORUDWLRQVWKH
DXWKRUVDUJXHWKDWWKH\FDQQRWEHVXUHZKHWKHUWKLVSRVLWLYHHIIHFWLVVROHO\
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)RXQGHUVLQVXFFHVVIXOVWDUWXSVUDWHWKHPVHOYHVKLJKO\LQWKHIROORZLQJ
SHUVRQDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFV$ELOLW\WRUHFRJQLVHDEXVLQHVVRSSRUWXQLW\DERYH
DYHUDJHVNLOOVLQDPDQDJHULDOUROHRUJDQLVDWLRQDODQGLQWHUSHUVRQDOVNLOOV
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WKHUHZHUHVRPOLPLWDWLRQV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EXVLQHVVHGXFDWLRQDIIHFWVJURZWKSRVLWLYHO\)RXQGHU¶VQXPEHURI\HDUVLQ
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XQLYHUVLW\OHYHOHGXFDWLRQLQPDQDJHPHQWDQGHFRQRPLFVDQG
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ZLWKORZWKUHVKROGVPD\FKRRVHWRFRQWLQXHVXUYLYHDOWKRXJKWKH\DUH
H[SHULHQFLQJORZSHUIRUPDQFH6RPHGLPHQVLRQVRIKXPDQFDSLWDO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WHFKQRORJ\YHQWXUHVDWWUDFW
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VLJQLILFDQWO\DIIHFWHGYHQWXUHVXUYLYDO7KHDFDGHPLFVWDWXVRIWKHIRXQGHU
GLGQRWDIIHFWVXUYLYDOLQDSRVLWLYHZD\)RXQGWKUHHUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQ
KXPDQFDSLWDODQGDWWUDFWLQJH[WHUQDOLQYHVWPHQW7KHDFDGHPLFVWDWXVRIWKH
IRXQGHUGLGKDYHDVLJQLILFDQWDQGSRVLWLYHHIIHFWRQWKHRGGVRIDFKLHYLQJ
H[WHUQDOLQYHVWPHQW%XVLQHVVPDQDJHPHQWH[SHUWLVHGLGDOVRKDYHDSRVLWLYH
HIIHFWRQH[WHUQDOLQYHVWPHQWZKHUHDVJHQHUDOWHFKQRORJLFDOH[SHUWLVHGLG
QRWLQFUHDVHWKHFKDQFHVRIREWDLQLQJH[WHUQDOLQYHVWPHQWLQDVLJQLILFDQW
ZD\

:RUNH[SHULHQFH
(GXFDWLRQ
$ORQJLWXGLQDOVWXG\RI
VXFFHVVDQGIDLOXUHDPRQJ
VFLHQWLVWVWDUWHGYHQWXUHV
*XUGRQ0$
.-6DPVRP
3URYLGHVDQH[SODQDWLRQIRU
VXFFHVVDQGIDLOXUHLQWHUPVRI
FRPSHWHQFLHVDQGFDSDELOLWHVRI
WKHHQWUHSUHQHXUV
/RQJLWXGLQDOLQWHUYLHZV
)ROORZHGILUPVIURPWR
0XOWLSOHFDVHVWXG\
6FLHQWLVWVWDUWHGYHQWXUHVLQ
1RUWKDPHULFDDQG&DQDGD
%LRPHGLFDOILUPV
0DNHVDSRLQWWKDWWKHTXDOLW\RIKXPDQFDSLWDOFRQWULEXWHVWRILUPVXUYLYDO
DQGJURZWKDQGWKDWKXPDQFDSLWDOLVGHSHQGHQWRQSHUVRQDOLW\YDULDEOHVDV
ZHOODVWHFKQLFDONQRZKRZ)RXQGWKHIROORZLQJUHDVRQVIRUVXFFHVV
4XDOLW\RIWKHVFLHQFHEXVLQHVVFDSDELOLWLHVRIWKHPDQDJHPHQWIXQFWLRQV
SHUVRQQHODVZHOODVYHQWXUHWHDPFDSDELOLWLHV7KHUHDVRQVIRUIDLOXUH
RYHUGHSHQGHQFHRQDQDUURZEDVHRIVXSSRUWQREXVLQHVVH[SHULHQFHODFN
RIHYLGHQFHRIWHDPEXLOGLQJIDLOXUHRIQHUYHDQGIDLOXUHWRDGGUHVVPDUNHW
SURSHUO\
([SHULHQFH
$FDGHPLFIRXQGHU
,QVHDUFKRIWKHSURILW
PD[LPL]LQJDFWRU
PRWLYDWLRQVDQGGHILQLWLRQVRI
VXFFHVVIURPQDVFHQW
DFDGHPLFHQWUHSUHQHXUV
+D\WHU
&KULVWRSKHU6
([DPLQHVWKHPRWLYDWLRQVRI
HQWUHSUHQHXUVDQGWKHLUSRVW
HVWDEOLVKPHQWGHILQLWRQVRI
VXFFHVV:K\GLG\RXHVWDEOLVK
\RXUFRPSDQ\"
4:KDWZHUH\RXUPDLQ
PRWLYDWLRQVWRGRVR"
41RZWKDW\RXUEXVLQHVVLV
HVWDEOLVKHGKRZGR\RXGHILQH
VXFFHVV"
,QGHSWKLQWHUYLHZVZLWK
QHVFHQWDFDGHPLF
HQWUHSUHQHXUV
6XFFHVVLVGHILQHGLQDQXPEHURIZD\VLQFOXGLQJWHFKQRORJ\GLIIXVLRQ
ILQDQFLDOJDLQDQGSHHUPRWLYDWLRQV0RQH\LVQRWWKHPDLQPRWLYDWLRQRI
DFDGHPLFHQWUHSUHQHXUVUDWKHULWLVDFRPSHQVDWLRQIRUWKHWLPHQRWVSHQWDW
WKHLUDFDGHPLFMREV2WKHUPRWLYDWLRQVDUHFDUHHUHQULFKPHQWLQGHSHQGHQF\
MREFUHDWLRQDQGSXEOLFVHUYLFH)LUPVDUHRIWHQHVWDEOLVKHGWRSXUVXHRWKHU
VRXUFHVRIGHYHORSPHQWIXQGLQJDQGIHZDFDGHPLFHQWUHSUHQHXUVDUH
LQWHUHVWHGLQJURZWK

$FDGHPLFIRXQGHU
7KHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQDQ
HQWUHSUHQHXU
VEDFNJURXQG
DQGSHUIRUPDQFHLQDQHZ
YHQWXUH -R+DQG-/HH
+RZHQWUHSUHQHXULDO
FKDUDFWHULVWLFVVXFKDVEDFNJURXQG
HGXFDWLRQH[SHULHQFHUHODWHGWR
SHUIRUPDQFHRIDYHQWXUHGXULQJ
WKHHDUO\VWDJHV
'DWDFROOHFWHGIURPVWDUW
XSILUPVLQ.RUHD(DUO\
VWDJHVDUHH[DPLQHG1RW
RQO\KLJKWHFKILPV
)RXQGWKDWHGXFDWLRQFRUUHODWHVZLWKSURILWDELOLW\EXWQRWZLWKJURZWK$
PDVWHULQVRFLDOVWXGLHVLPSURYHVSURILWDELOLW\ZKHUHDVQDWXUDOVFLHQFHVDUH
SRVLWLYHO\UHODWHGWRJURZWK)XUWKHUPRUHIRXQGWKDWPDQDJHULDOH[SHULHQFH
DIIHFWVSHUIRUPDQFHQHJDWLYHO\RQPRVWRFFDVLRQV'LGQRWKDYHDQ\
VLJQLILFDQWILQGLQJVZLWKUHJDUGVWRHQWUHSUHQHXULDOH[SHULHQFH¶VHIIHFWRQ
SHUIRUPDQFH)XUWKHUPRUHDSURIHVVLRQDOEDFNJURXQGZRUNH[SHULHQFH
UHODWHGWRWKHSURGXFWKDVDSRVLWLYHHIIHFWRQJURZWK
(GXFDWLRQ
:RUNH[SHULHQFH
6XFFHVVFULWHULDLQKLJKWHFK
QHZYHQWXUHV .DNDWL0
:KDWFULWHULDLQIOXHQFHWKH
SHUIRUPDQFHRIKLJKWHFKYHQWXUHV"
9&VZKRKDGERWK
H[SHULHQFHGIDLOXUHDQG
VXFFHVVZHUHDVNHGWRUDWH
ERWKVXFFHVVIXODQGIDLOLQJ
KLJKWHFKYHQWXUHVRQ
FULWHULD
)RXQGWKDWUHVRXUFHEDVHGFULWHULDDQGWKHYHQWXUH¶VFRPSHWLWLYHVWUDWHJ\
VFRUHGKLJKLQLPSRUWDQFHIRUVXFFHVVIXOYHQWXUHV)RUIDLOHGYHQWXUHVWKH\
ZHUHUDWHGORZHU)XUWKHUPRUHIDLOHGYHQWXUHVODFNHGDOHDGHUVKLSTXDOLW\
DQGWKHDELOLW\WRHYDOXDWHDQGUHDFWWRULVN)RXQGWKDWPDUNHWDQGILQDQFLDO
FULWHULDZHUHQRWWKDWFUXFLDO6XFFHVVIXOYHQWXUHVDUHFKDUDFWHULVHGE\KDYLQJ
H[FHSWLRQDOHQWUHSUHQHXULDOTXDOLW\OHDGHUVKLSDELOLW\DQGKDQGOHGULVNZHOO

:RUNH[SHULHQFH
(GXFDWLRQ
$UWLFOH $XWKRU 5HVHDUFK4XHVWLRQ $SSURDFKPHWKRG .H\ILQGLQJV
+XPDQFDSLWDO
RSHUDWLRQDOL]DWLRQV
7KHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ
NQRZOHGJHWUDQVIHUWRS
PDQDJHPHQWWHDP
FRPSRVLWLRQDQG
SHUIRUPDQFH7KHFDVHRI
VFLHQFHEDVHGHQWUHSUHQHXULDO
ILUPV
.QRFNDHUW0
8FEDVDUDQ'
:ULJKW0
&ODU\VVH%
+RZFDQNQRZOHGJHEHWUDQVIHUUHG
DQGHPSOR\HGLQ6%()VLQRUGHUWR
HQKDQFH6%()SHUIRUPDQFH"
,QGXFWLYHFDVHVWXG\0XOWL
FDVHHPEHGGHGUHVHDUFKDV
GHVLJQ7KHFDVHV
RULJLQDWHGIURPRQHUHVHDUFK
LQVWLWXWHLQ%HOJLXP'DWD
ZDVSULPDULO\SURYLGHGIURP
WKHIRXQGHUDQGRU&(2
VXSSOHPHQWHGIURPRWKHU
VRXUFHV
)RXQGWKDWWKHSURSRUWLRQRILQYHQWRUVSUHVHQWLQWKHIRXQGLQJWHDPDVZHOO
DVWKHFRPELQDWLRQRIERWKWHFKQLFDODQGFRPPHUFLDOPLQGVHWVLQWKHWHDP
ZDVUHODWHGWRWDFLWNQRZOHGJHWUDQVIHUZKLFKZDVQHHGHGWRILQLVKWKHILUVW
SURGXFWPRUHTXLFNO\+RZHYHUWKHFRJQLWLYHGLVWDQFHRIWKRVHSRVVHVVLQJ
WKHWHFKQLFDODQGFRPPHUFLDONQRZOHGJHFDQQRWEHWRRODUJH7KRVHWKDW
H[SHULHQFHGWKHTXLFNHVWVSHHGWRILUVWSURGXFWKDGWHDPPHPEHUVZLWK
FRPPHUFLDONQRZOHGJHWKDWDOVRKDGSUHYLRXVWHFKQLFDOH[SHULHQFHRU
HGXFDWLRQDVZHOODVMRLQWZRUNH[SHULHQFHZLWKWHFKQLFDOWHDPPHPEHUV
$FDGHPLFIRXQGHU
:RUNH[SHULHQFH
(GXFDWLRQ
7HDPKHWHURJHQLW\
.QRZOHGJHOHDUQLQJDQG
VPDOOILUPJURZWK$
V\VWHPDWLFUHYLHZRIWKH
HYLGHQFH
0DFSKHUVRQ$
5+ROW
([DPLQHVKRZKXPDQDQGVRFLDO
FDSLWDORUJDQL]DWLRQDOV\VWHPV
DQGNQRZOHGJHQHWZRUNVFRPELQH
WRIDFLOLWDWHRUUHVWULFWJURZWK
5HYLHZVSDSHUVZULWWHQRQ
JURZWKDQGNQRZOHGJHLQ
VPDOOILUPV6WUXFWXUHG
UHYLHZ1RWMXVW17%)V
SDSHUVLQWRWDO
'LGDUHYLHZRIKRZHPSLULFDOUHVHDUFKRQNQRZOHGJHDQGJURZWKLVUHSRUWHG
LQVPDOOILUPV8VHGILYHGLPHQVLRQVGXULQJWKHUHYLHZDQGLGHQWLILHG
UHVHDUFKJDSVIRUHDFKGLPHQVLRQODQGVFDSHRIILHOGKXPDQDQGVRFLDO
FDSLWDORUJDQL]DWLRQDOV\VWHPVDQGVWUXFWXUHVQHWZRUNVDQGKROLVWLFWKHPHV
0DNHVWKHFDVHWKDWWKHUHIHZW\SLFDOFDVHVDPRQJVPDOOILUPV3RLQWVRXW
WKDWLWVKRXOGEHXVHIXOWROHDUQPRUHDERXWWKHOHDUQLQJSURFHVVHVLQVXFK
ILUPV

:RUNH[SHULHQFH
7HFKQRORJ\HQWUHSUHQHXUV

KXPDQFDSLWDODQGLWVHIIHFWV
RQLQQRYDWLRQUDGLFDOQHVV
0DUYHO05
/XPSNLQ*7
,QYHVWLJDWHKRZDVSHFWVRI
LQGLYLGXDOKXPDQFDSLWDODUHOLQNHG
WRWKHUHFRJQLWLRQRIRSSRUWXQLWLHV
EHDULQJUDGLFDOLQQRYDWLRQ
RXWFRPHV
$OLWHUDWXUHUHYLHZUHVXOWHG
LQK\SRWKHVLVDPHULFDQ
LQFXEDWRUVWRRNSDUWLQD
VWXG\UHVXOWLQJLQLQGLYLGXDO
PHHWLQJVZLWKIRXQGHUV7KH
ILQDOVDPSOHFRQVLVWHGRI
WHFKQRORJ\
HQWUHSUHQHXUVIURPWKH
0LGZHVW
)RXQGWKDWWKHUHDUHWZRUHDVRQVIRUZK\HQWUHSUHQHXUVKDYHDUDGLFDO
LQQRYDWLRQDGYDQWDJH)LUVWWKH\KDYHULFKNQRZOHGJHUHODWHGWRWHFKQRORJ\
6HFRQGO\WKH\DUHDEOHWREHFUHDWLYHZLWKRXWEHLQJUHVWUDLQHGE\WKHLU
NQRZOHGJHRIFXUUHQWPDUNHWVDQGFXVWRPHUV,QQRYDWLRQRXWFRPHVDUH
GHSHQGHQWRQERWKJHQHUDODQGVSHFLILFKXPDQFDSLWDO)RUPDOHGXFDWLRQDQG
SULRUNQRZOHGJHRIWHFKQRORJ\ERWKKDYHDSRVLWLYHLQIOXHQFHRQLQQRYDWLRQ
UDGLFDOQHVVZKLOVWSULRUNQRZOHGJHRIKRZWRVHUYHPDUNHWVDIIHFWV
LQQRYDWLRQUDGLFDOQHVVQHJDWLYHO\
:RUN([SHULHQFH
(GXFDWLRQ
+XPDQ&DSLWDODQG6HDUFK
%DVHG'LVFRYHU\$6WXG\RI
+LJK7HFK(QWUHSUHQHXUVKLS
0DUYHO0DWWKHZ
5
7KLVVWXG\H[DPLQHVWKH
NQRZOHGJHDQGH[SHULHQFHRIQHZ
WHFKQRORJ\HQWUHSUHQHXUVZKRKDG
EHHQVHDUFKLQJIRUDQRSSRUWXQLW\
FRPSDUHGWRWKRVHZKRLGHQWLILHG
RSSRUWXQLWLHVZLWKRXWVHDUFKLQJ
:KDWW\SHVRINQRZOHGJHDQG
H[SHULHQFHHQDEOHWKRVHZKRKDYH
WKHGHVLUHWRVWDUWDYHQWXUHWRILQG
DQDSSURSULDWHRSSRUWXQLW\"
5HYLHZVOLWWHUDWXUHDQG
GHULYHVK\SRWKHVHVUHODWHGWR
VHDUFKEDVHGGLVFRYHU\
,QWHUYLHZVIRXQGHUV
IURPWHFKQRORJ\EDVHG
YHQWXUHV\HDUVRU\RXQJHU
*HQHUDODQGKXPDQFDSLWDODUHXVHIXOWRH[SODLQWKHPRGHLQZKLFK
RSSRUWXQLWLHVDUHUHDOL]HG3URIHVVLRQDOH[SHULHQFHZDVQHJDWLYHO\UHODWHGWR
VHDUFKEDVHGGLVFRYHU\3ULRUNQRZOHGJHRQKRZWRVHUYHPDUNHWVDQG
FXVWRPHUVZDVSRVLWLYHO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKVHDUFKEDVHGGLVFRYHU\,QGLFDWHV
WKDWPDUNHWNQRZOHGJHDOORZV\RXWRILQGEHWWHURSSRUWXQLWLHVWRPHHW
FXVWRPHUQHHGV2SSRUWXQLW\WKDWFDPHDERXWZLWKRXWDVHDUFKZHUH
LGHQWLILHGRUGHYHORSHGE\HQWUHSUHQHXUVZLWKPRUHH[SHULHQFHRUHGXFDWLRQ
(QWUHSUHQHXUVWKDWKDYHPRUHSURIHVVLRQDOZRUNH[SHULHQFHDUHQRWDVOLNHO\
WRVHDUFKIRURSSRUWXQLWLHV6WDUWXSH[SHULHQFHUDLVHVOLNHOLKRRGWKDWDQ
HQWUHSUHQHXUZLOOVHDUFKDQGILQGRSSRUWXQLWLHVLQWKHIXWXUH5DWKHUWKH\
FRPHDFURVVWKHPLQDQDFFLGHQWDOZD\

:RUNH[SHULHQFH
(GXFDWLRQ
(QWUHSUHQHXULDOWDOHQWDQG
YHQWXUHSHUIRUPDQFH$PHWD
DQDO\WLFLQYHVWLJDWLRQRI
60(V
0D\HU+DXJ
.DWULQ
5HDG6WXDUW
%ULQFNPDQQ-DQ
'HZ1LFKRODV
*ULFKQLN'LHWPDU
+RZGRHVHQWUHSUHQHXULDOWDOHQW
DIIHFWSHUIRUPDQFH
$UHYLHZRIOLWWHUDWXUHDV
ZHOODVDPHWDDQDO\VLVRI
ILUPV60(VE\
V\QWKHVL]LQJSULRUHPSLULFDO
VWXGLHV
)RXQGDZHDNFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQHGXFDWLRQDQGSHUIRUPDQFH7UDFNHG
SODQQLQJVNLOOVHIIHFWRQSHUIRUPDQFHDQGIRXQGDFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQ
SODQQLQJDQGSHUIRUPDQFH3ODQQLQJVNLOOVLVRQHRIVHYHUDOPHDVXUHVRI
WDOHQW
:RUNH[SHULHQFH
(GXFDWLRQ
$UWLFOH $XWKRU 5HVHDUFK4XHVWLRQ $SSURDFKPHWKRG .H\ILQGLQJV
+XPDQFDSLWDO
RSHUDWLRQDOL]DWLRQV
)URPKXPDQFDSLWDOWRVRFLDO
FDSLWDODORQJLWXGLQDOVWXG\
RIWHFKQRORJ\EDVHGDFDGHPLF
HQWUHSUHQHXUV
0RVH\6
:ULJKW0
+RZGRGLIIHUHQFHVLQWKHKXPDQ
FDSLWDOGHULYHGIURPWKH
HQWUHSUHQHXULDOH[SHULHQFHRI
DFDGHPLFHQWUHSUHQHXUVLQIOXHQFH
WKHLUDELOLW\WRGHYHORSVRFLDO
FDSLWDO"
0XOWLSOHFDVHVWXG\
VXEMHFWVERWKQRYLFH
KDELWXDODQGQDVFHQW
HQWUHSUHQHXUV/RQJLWXGLQDO
VWXG\
)RXQGWKDWSULRULQGXVWULDOH[SHULHQFHZDVQRWUHODWHGWRYHQWXUHJURZWK$
UHODWLRQH[LVWHGIRUEXVLQHVVRZQHUVKLSH[SHULHQFH0DGHDGLIIHUHQFHIRU
QDVFHQWHQWUHSUHQHXUVRSSRUWXQLW\UHFRJQLWLRQDQGQRYLFHHQWUHSUHQHXUV
SKDVLQJWKHHQWUHSUHQHXULDOFRPPLWPHQWSKDVH,QWKHIRUPHUVRPHXVH
WKHLUQHWZRUNWRJDLQFULWLFDOUHVRXUFHV7RUHDFKWKHFUHGLELOLW\SKDVHWKH\
QHHGIXQGLQJDQGLQGXVWU\VSHFLILFNQRZOHGJH7KHODWWHUXVHVFRQWDFWVWR
DFTXLUHEXVLQHVVUHVRXUFHV+DELWXDOHQWUHSUHQHXUVHPSKDVLVHGWKHYDOXHWR
SURYLGHUVRILQGXVWU\NQRZOHGJHEXVLQHVVGHYHORSPHQWNQRZOHGJHDQG
WHFKQLFDONQRZOHGJH7KHVHDOVRFRQWLQXHGWRVHHYDOXHLQWKHLUUHVHDUFK
FROOHDJXHV

:RUNH[SHULHQFH
$FDGHPLFIRXQGHU

$VWDJHPRGHORIDFDGHPLF
VSLQRIIFUHDWLRQ
1GRQ]XDX)1
3LUQD\)
6XUOHPRQW%
7KHSDSHUIRFXVHVRQWKHFUHDWLRQ
RIDFDGHPLFVSLQRIIVDQGDLPVDW
LGHQWLI\LQJXQGHUVWDGLQJDQG
GLVWLQJXLVKHVWKHPDMRULVVXHVWKDW
DUHUDLVHGE\WKHFUHDWLRQRI
DFDGHPLFVSLQRIIVERWKIURPWKH
SRLQWRIYLHZRIDFDGHPLFDQG
SXEOLFDXWKRULWLHV
)LUVWWKH\LGHQWLILHG
LQWHUQDWLRQDOVSLQRII
VXSSRUWSURJUDPPHVWKDW
IXOILOOHGWKHFULWHULDWKH\KDG
VHW7KHQWKH\LQWHUYLHZHG
RIILFLDOVDWWKHVH
XQLYHUVLWLHVLQFOXGLQJ
IRXQGHUVRIVSLQRII
FRPSDQLHVPDQDJHUVRI
XQLYHUVLWLHVOLDLVRQRIILFHV
DQGLQFXEDWRUVIURPORFDO
GHYHORSPHQWDJHQFLHV
7KH\GHYHORSDPRGHOH[SODLQLQJZKDWKDSSHQVLQWKHEODFNER[EHWZHHQ
UHVHDUFKUHVXOWVEHLQJPDGHXQWLOHFRQRPLFYDOXHKDVEHHQFUHDWHG7KLV
PRGHOFRQVLVWVRIIRXUVWHSVZKLFKHDFKHQGXSZLWKDQHZVWDWXVWKDWWKH
UHVHDUFKUHVXOWVKDYHWRXQGHUJRLQRUGHUWRHQGXSFUHDWLQJHFRQRPLFYDOXH
)LUVWWKH\JHQHUDWHEXVLQHVVLGHDV6HFRQGO\WKH\ILQDOLVHQHZYHQWXUH
SURMHFWVEHIRUHVSLQRIIILUPVDUHODXQFKHG7KHVHDUHIXUWKHUVWUHQJWKHQHGLQ
RUGHUWRVWDUWWKHFUHDWLRQRIHFRQRPLFYDOXH7RSDVVIURPRQHVWDJHWRWKH
QH[WWKHYHQWXUHKDVWRSDVVWKURXJKDFULWLFDOMXQFWXUHFKDUDFWHULVHGE\
FKDOOHQJHVUHODWHGWRWKHVSHFLILFMXQFWXUH7KHPRGHOFDQEHXVHGWRPDNH
VXLWDEOHLQVWLWXWLRQDOPHFKDQLVPVWRVXSSRUWDFDGHPLFHQWUHSUHQHXUVKLS
(QWUHSUHQHXULDORULHQWDWLRQ
WHFKQRORJ\WUDQVIHUDQG
VSLQRIISHUIRUPDQFHRI86
XQLYHUVLWLHV
2
6KHD53
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ABSTRACT 
Commercializing of technology from academic institutions through the establishment of academic 
spin-offs is gaining increased attention from scholars and policy makers. This article focuses on the 
human capital of the top management team in academic spin-offs, in particular that of the chief 
executive officer. Through synthesizing existing literature on human capital and academic spin-off 
performance a set of hypotheses was put forth, building on the previous work of Bjerkholt et al. 
(2014). These investigate the relation between different types of work experience and education 
present in the top management team, and their effect on ASO performance. We also explore whether 
the presence of an academic founder (inventor) affect performance positively. By performing a 
comprehensive quantitative study on 100 Norwegian academic spin-offs we were able to test the 
support for these hypotheses. We found that managerial experience affects performance positively. 
Even more significant and positive was the effect of managerial education. Surprisingly, we found 
that the presence of PhD degrees had a positive and moderately significant effect on performance. 
With regards to academic founders, we found that academic founders possessing commercial 
knowledge have a positive effect on performance. Our results are of interest to entrepreneurs, 
investors, technology transfer offices and policy makers as they indicate that some types of human 
capital are more important than others in spin-off development.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The commercialization of technology and the 
generation of wealth from universities and 
other research institutions is of growing 
interest among scholars and policymakers 
(Mustar et al., 2006, Wright et al., 2007a, 
Rothaermel et al., 2007). Following the US 
Bayh-Dole act in 1980, many European 
countries, counting Norway, have adopted 
similar policies and several other initiatives to 
stimulate the growth of academic spin-offs 
(ASOs) (Wright et al., 2007a, Rasmussen et 
al., 2013). ASOs have thus become a popular 
mechanism to transfer and commercialize 
knowledge from research institutions. 
Even though some ASOs are highly 
successful (Shane, 2004) it is found that most 
spin-offs remain small and many do not 
generate substantial wealth (Nerkar and Shane, 
2003, Wright et al., 2007a, Wright et al., 2012, 
Harrison and Leitch, 2010). This is also the 
case for Norwegian science based firms 
(Rasmussen, 2012). Consequently, this there is 
a need to understand how these firms develop, 
and especially, why some ASOs perform 
better than others. Such knowledge may be 
constructive input in designing effective 
support mechanisms which in turn can assist 
spin-offs in performing better.  
The performance of young ASOs is 
strongly related to the human capital of 
founders, where human capital refers to skills 
and knowledge derived from education and 
experience (Becker, 1964). In the earliest 
stages of a technology venture, when essential 
resources have not yet been acquired and  
 
developed, the resources of the venture are 
strongly correlated with the human capital of 
the founders (Cooper and Bruno, 1977). 
Furthermore, the early decisions and actions 
that take place in an ASO have lasting effects 
on its development path (Bamford et al., 
2000). As the decisions and choices made 
relies on the human capital of the founders, the 
human capital present in the early stages of an 
ASO is likely to ultimately affect long-term 
performance. This is supported by several 
scholars (Unger et al., 2011, Aspelund et al., 
2005, Clarysse and Moray, 2004, Bamford et 
al., 2000, Brush, 2001) and can be explained 
by several factors; Firstly, because ASOs 
commercialize high technology inventions and 
operate in knowledge-intensive and complex 
environments, there is a need to integrate 
different kinds of human capital to create a 
competitive advantage (Unger et al., 2011, 
Kirzner, 1997, Utterback, 1996). Secondly, 
human capital can reduce the “liability of 
newness”, which is related to the lack of 
resources and their limited ability to access 
these resources. This is partly attributed to 
insufficient networks to investors, customers 
and other stakeholders (Stinchcombe, 1965). 
Arguably, networks gained through previous 
work experience and education give access to 
valuable resources, thereby reducing the 
liability of newness. 
In light of the above, we chose to 
focus on human capital in earlier stages, as this 
is suggested to be a key issue in predicting 
long term-performance of ASOs. As an 
extension to Bjerk
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human capital of entrepreneurial teams and 
performance of ASOs, we conduct an 
empirical study on how the human capital of 
ASOs’ “top management teams” (TMTs) and 
especially how the function of the chief 
executive officer (CEO) affects performance. 
Since organizational outcomes of a firm are 
dependent on the characteristics of the TMT 
and the top leader (Hambrick and Mason, 
1984), the performance of an ASO is arguably 
dependent on the human capital of these 
individuals. We furthermore investigate the 
importance of having an academic founder 
present in the early phases of development. 
This is considered to be especially critical for 
ASOs as the firm is typically built upon the 
tacit knowledge of the inventor (Shane, 2004, 
Zucker et al., 1999). Hence, the value of the 
academic founder cannot simply be explained 
in terms of which human capital he or she has 
and must therefore be treated separately. Our 
research questions read:  
“How do different types of human 
capital of the top management team affect the 
performance of ASOs?” and “How does the 
presence of an academic founder affect the 
performance of an ASO?”  
The study contributes to the expanding field of 
literature which investigates how different 
types of human capital affects performance of 
an ASO in an empirical setting. Set in a 
Norwegian context, we use a sample that is 
likely to differ from that of frequently used US 
samples (Rothaermel et al., 2007, O'Shea et 
al., 2005). Although ASOs face many of the 
same challenges, country-specific contextual 
factors such as public policies, support 
programmes and funding conditions differ. 
This may ultimately influence the 
development and performance of the ASO, 
meaning there lies value in studying spin-offs 
from non-US contexts. Furthermore, the 
political system of Norway is designed in a 
way which allows for a comprehensive 
overview of the outcomes of spin-off creation, 
perhaps more so than in other countries.  
Following this, the study is based on 
longitudinal data from 100 Norwegian ASOs 
registered in the “FORNY-program”. The 
FORNY database is unique as it provides 
consistent and detailed data of the vast 
majority of ASOs established in Norway since 
1995 (Borlaug, 2009). Furthermore, it includes 
data from both successful and failed firms, 
making it an excellent and extensive source of 
data for quantitative as well as qualitative 
studies on ASOs. Quantitative empirical 
testing of conceptual models has frequently 
been called for, as this has traditionally been 
lacking in the ASO research context (Djokovic 
and Souitaris, 2008). This study has a 
quantitative approach where we 
consider  changes in the human capital 
throughout the initial development of the 
ASO. This allows us to overcome some of the 
limitations associated with static studies.  
The research question should be of 
interest to policy makers, scholars, 
entrepreneurs and investors, as it seeks to 
explain and clarify some of the mechanisms 
and characteristics leading to successful spin-
offs in a European context. 
 
This article is structured as follows; First, 
based on the findings of Bjerkholt et al.(2014), 
a set of hypotheses which relate human capital 
to the TMT and the performance of the spin-
off is presented. Next, a detailed description of 
the quantitative data collection is given, 
followed by an outline of some methodical 
limitations. Our data is analysed using a series 
of regression methods and is presented in the 
following chapter. Section 5 discusses the 
results and outcome of the hypothesis testing. 
The conclusion considers the practical 
implications for different stakeholders. The 
article concludes with limitations and further 
research.  
2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Based on the Resourced-based Theory (RBT) 
and Knowledge-based View (KBV), Bjerkholt 
et al. (2014) provided a state of the art review 
of existing literature on how founders’ human 
capital affects ASO performance. Their study 
resulted in a set of hypotheses where work 
experience and education were used as proxies 
for human capital. Furthermore they looked at 
how the presence of the academic founder 
affects performance. This section will briefly 
present the definition of an ASO and the same 
definition will be used in this article. 
There is a lack of consensus among 
researchers as to how to define a university, or 
academic, spin-off. The employment of 
imprecise and vague definitions may have 
disadvantageous effects on academic 
entrepreneurship research as scholars are 
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likely to use the same terms even though they 
describe different situations and phenomena 
(Pirnay et al., 2003). This article will use 
Bjerkholt et al.(2014)’s definition, adapted 
from Nicolaou and Birley (2003), Pirnay et al. 
(2003) and Clarysse and Heirman (2000):  
 An academic spin-off (ASO) is defined 
as “(i) The transfer of a some knowledge, 
technology or research result from a host 
institute (university, technical school, 
public/private R&D department) into a new 
company. (ii) The founding member(s) may 
include the inventor academic(s) who may or 
may not be currently affiliated with the host 
institution.”  
This definition is useful as it opens up 
for the commercialization of early stage 
research results. Moreover, it does not confine 
“founder” to only the academic founder, 
hence, it includes the use of surrogate 
entrepreneurs. Lastly, as the 
commercialization of research takes place in 
all research institutions, which arguably 
experience similar challenges as universities, 
the definition does not exclusively consider 
universities. 
2.2 Human capital and 
performance 
The purpose of this article is to examine how 
different types of human capital, namely 
experience and education, of the TMT and in 
particular the CEO affects performance of the 
spin-off. We will also investigate how the 
inital presence of the academic founder affects 
performance. As Bjerkholt et al. (2014)’s 
review was related to the human capital of the 
founding team we will make a justification for 
the use of their findings in relation to the 
aforementioned research question. We would 
argue that the terms “founding team” and the 
“top management team” of early stage spin-
offs are closely related both in theory and 
practice. The TMT is described as the group of 
people who are responsible for strategic 
decision making (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992, 
Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Ensley and 
Hmieleski (2005) requires that TMT-members 
need to meet two of the three criteria; they 
have to be founders, significant equity 
stakeholders or involved in the strategic 
decision making of the firm. 
Scholars have many ways of 
describing the criteria for being part of the 
entrepreneurial, or founding team; They own 
equity, take managerial roles and are 
responsible for making strategic decisions 
(Ganotakis, 2012, Colombo and Grilli, 2005, 
Cooney and Bygrave, 1997, Ucbasaran et al., 
2003). Some describe the entrepreneurial team 
members as core people having played an 
active role in the founding and growing of the 
startup (Wright et al., 2007a, Ensley et al., 
1998). Although definitions of 
founding/entrepreneurial teams are not 
consistent, we would argue that in young 
ASOs, the entrepreneurial team and the TMT 
are very closely related, and in some cases 
identical. An ASO may consist of a large 
group of researchers, each having various 
degrees of commitment and responsibility. 
However, the core entrepreneurial team 
arguably consists of key people active in the 
founding of the startup, which are in power to 
take strategic decisions related to the 
development of the spin-off. These are in other 
words, the TMT. Following the above 
arguments, the theoretical foundation of this 
article is therefore based on the literature 
derived from founding/entrepreneurial teams. 
 
The following sections outline the findings on 
human capital from Bjerkholt et al (2014). We 
note that human capital is related to the stock 
of skills and knowledge derived from 
education and experience (Becker, 1964). 
Because skills and knowledge are difficult to 
measure, most researchers use human capital 
investments, such as education and work 
experience, as proxies for human capital 
(Unger et al., 2011). Since there is a strong 
relationship between these human capital 
investments and their potential outcomes 
(skills and knowledge) (Unger et al., 2011, 
Unger et al., 2009), this is a reasonable, and 
also a necessary approach. Accordingly, it will 
also be applied in this article.  
2.2.1 Work experience and 
performance 
Work experience is valuable as it allows an 
employee to accumulate tacit knowledge 
through episodic skills and learning-by-doing 
(Arrow, 1962, Jovanovic, 1982, Wright et al., 
2007b). Work experience can enhance an 
individual’s ability to accumulate new 
knowledge, adapt to new situations and may 
also increase productivity (Parker, 2006, 
Davidsson and Honig, 2003).  
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Many researchers assess work 
experience by grouping them into different 
types that are believed to relevant for the ASO 
setting (Ganotakis, 2012, Gimmon, 2010, 
Ucbasaran et al., 2008, Wright et al., 2007b). 
Although some of the categories may overlap, 
they arguably cover skills that may help an 
entrepreneur in developing a performing spin-
off. In line with the above authors we 
categorize experience the following way: 
Managerial, commercial, technical and 
entrepreneurial experience. We present our 
findings on how they affect the performance of 
an ASO below. 
 
Managerial work experience, which refers to 
the experience of running a firm, leading its 
employees and to make complex strategic and 
organizational decisions, is by many 
researchers recognised as being positive to 
firm performance and growth (Ucbasaran et 
al., 2008, Aspelund et al., 2005, Ganotakis, 
2012, Santarelli and Hien Thu, 2013). 
Managerial experience may enhance a 
person’s ability to see means end relationships 
and assemble the resources necessary to 
convert an idea into a business opportunity 
(Gaglio and Katz, 2001, Ardichvili et al., 
2003, Ucbasaran et al., 2008). Scholars also 
suggest that ASO performance is positively 
correlated with the number of years in 
managerial roles, implying that management 
and leadership is a matter of practice rather 
than an academic talent (Colombo and Grilli, 
2009, Gurdon and Samsom, 2010, Gimmon, 
2010). Furthermore, managerial experience is 
believed to increase the chance of receiving 
venture capital (VC) funding, as VCs tend to 
look for experienced individuals that are likely 
to run a company successfully (Colombo and 
Grilli, 2009, Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984). In 
contrast to the above, Gimeno et al. (1997) and 
Davidsson and Honig (2003) found that 
managerial experience failed to demonstrate a 
significant effect on performance, arguing that 
managerial experience fosters procedures that 
do not stimulate effective resource allocation 
in young firms. Since the focus of these 
studies were on the very earliest phases of 
spin-off development, one may argue that 
managerial experience in the TMT is of lesser 
importance in early phases of opportunity 
recognition. Furthermore, it is suggested to 
become more needed as the firm prepares for 
growth, in terms of increasing the number of 
employees, turnover, sales and production 
activity. Hence, setting in place organisational 
structures and routines should become more 
important as the boundaries and scope of the 
firm expands.  
 Nevertheless, the majority of the 
literature seems to suggest that the positive 
influence of managerial work experience 
outweighs the negative, and the following 
hypothesis is put forward:  
 
1a. Managerial work experience in the top 
management team has a positive effect on 
academic spin-off performance.  
 
Technical work experience, namely prior 
experience in technical or scientific roles 
including R&D, engineering or manufacturing 
is believed to be especially important in firms 
that operate in rapidly changing markets. This 
is arguably the case for high technology firms 
(Knockaert et al., 2011, Unger et al., 2011, 
Shrader and Siegel, 2007, Ittner and Larcker, 
1997). Many scholars do however argue that 
technical experience should be complemented 
with commercial or managerial experience to 
ensure firm performance (Kakati, 2003, 
Oakey, 2003, Ganotakis, 2012, Gurdon and 
Samsom, 2010, Aspelund et al., 2005), as an 
overemphasis on the technical side may lead to 
the lack of attention to commercial aspects 
(Kakati, 2003).  
Nevertheless, as the majority of ASOs 
based on high technology inventions are built 
on the tacit knowledge of academic founders 
(Lowe, 2006, Carlile and Rebentisch, 2003), 
technical experience in the TMT is essential. 
We note that even though some knowledge is 
made explicit through patents, successful 
exploitation of patents and licenses is likely to 
require some tacit knowledge (Shane, 2004). 
There are several reasons for technical 
experience being imporant: (i) It will enhance 
the effectiveness of transfer of tacit knowledge 
from founders to the rest of the team as the 
cognitive gap becomes smaller (Zucker et al., 
1999, Knockaert et al., 2011) (ii) It will 
enhance the TMT’s ability to translate the 
technology into marketable product as well as 
create innovative products suited customer 
needs (Park, 2005, Ganotakis, 2012, Unger et 
al., 2011, Shrader and Siegel, 2007, Knockaert 
et al., 2011). This is because technically 
experienced individuals are likely to be 
familiar with the technology’s potential and 
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limitations as well as how it can be customized 
once a market is identified (iii) It will allow 
for more effective product/prototype 
development; Technically experienced 
individuals are more likely to have skills 
related to product development or have an 
accessible network of people that know how to 
develop products. This may in turn make the 
development process cheaper and faster as 
well as reduce the risks involved (Ucbasaran et 
al., 2008). 
Arguably, as technical experience is 
related to recognising the best product-market 
fit as well as prototype development, one may 
suggest that technical experience is of critical 
importance in the early stages of spin-off 
development. The following hypothesis is put 
forward:  
 
1b: Technical work experience in the top 
management team has a positive effect on 
academic spin-off performance. 
 
Commercial work experience relates to 
previous employment with marketing and 
sales related tasks, as well as contact with 
customers, suppliers and manufacturers. 
Commercial experience is considered valuable 
due to several reasons: (i) It enhances the 
TMT’s ability to recognise the commercial 
value of a technology as such experience 
implies the understanding of how customers 
and suppliers interact (Vohora et al., 2004, 
Park, 2005, Shane, 2000, Marvel, 2013).´ (ii) 
It may help identify unserved markets where 
the product will be radically different to other 
competitors as previous experience may have 
given a better overview of the supply side of 
the market as well as how one may design a 
differentiation strategy (Aspelund et al., 2005, 
Shrader and Siegel, 2007, Shane, 2000) (iii) It 
enhances the TMT’s ability to interact with 
customers, distributors, suppliers and industry 
partners as they have the experience with such 
tasks. Furthermore, they are likely to have 
developed such networks (Marvel and 
Lumpkin, 2007, von Hippel, 1988). However, 
in line with what is mentioned earlier, 
commercial experience should be 
complemented with technical experience 
(Wright et al., 2007b, Ganotakis, 2012, 
Colombo and Grilli, 2005) as this will enhance 
the TMT’s ability to understand and 
communicate how the product can be tailored 
to fit customer needs (Knockaert et al., 2011). 
Based on the above, the following hypothesis 
is put forward:  
 
1c: Commercial work experience in the top 
management team has a positive effect on 
academic spin-off performance.  
 
Entrepreneurial work experience, or the 
experience with starting a business, is 
generally believed to be positively linked to 
the performance of ASOs (Davidsson and 
Honig, 2003, Ucbasaran et al., 2008, Mosey 
and Wright, 2007). Entrepreneurial experience 
may prove beneficial as it; (i) Provides access 
to external human capital gained through 
entrepreneurial networks. This may increase 
the chances of getting seed and investment 
finance (Mosey et al., 2006). Furthermore, 
access to entrepreneurial networks increases 
the chances of meeting other experienced 
entrepreneurs that may serve as advisors or 
board members (Mosey and Wright, 2007) (ii) 
Gives an individual direct learning from 
episodic skills about the entrepreneurial 
process. Thus it allows for the accumulation of 
tacit knowledge. This may arguably be helpful 
the second-time around (Wright et al., 2007b, 
Spender, 1996).  
Prior start-up management is also 
suggested to be a strong human capital signal 
to investors and thereby increases the chances 
of obtaining VC funding (Colombo and Grilli, 
2005, Hsu, 2007). On the contrary, Santarelli 
and Hien Thu (2013) suggest that 
entrepreneurial experience may hamper 
performance because firstly, second-time 
entrepreneurs may be more cautious to risk 
and less willing to take chances. Secondly, 
second-time entrepreneurs may be more likely 
to become overconfident and adopt strategies 
and routines that have worked in the past 
rather than making new ones. Although the 
research on entrepreneurial experience has 
produced divergent results, the positive 
outcomes appear to dominate. The following 
hypothesis is put forward:  
 
1d: Entrepreneurial work experience in the top 
management team has a positive effect on 
academic spin-off performance. 
 
Reviewing the hypotheses we observe that 
according to literature, all types of experience 
seem to have a positive impact on the 
performance of an ASO. Even though this may 
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reflect reality, we would argue that some types 
show a more positive effect in certain phases 
of spin-off development than others and that 
this is worth investigating. Technical and 
commercial work experience, for example, 
seems to be essential in early phases as there is 
a need to identify the best commercial market 
and customize the technology to satisfy 
customer needs. In contrast, managerial work 
experience seems to be of greater importance 
in later phases. As the spin-off prepares for 
growth, the need for skills on how to run a 
company, allocate resources and design 
strategies arise. Nevertheless, testing whether 
all types of experience are equally positive is 
an interesting topic of research.  
Furthermore, as human capital needs 
depend on contextual factors (Unger et al., 
2011), we believe that our Norwegian ASO 
context may yield different results. As pointed 
out by Bjerkholt et al. (2014), only 27% of the 
studies they found relevant for this research 
area specifically addressed ASOs. Hence, 
there is value in investigating whether these 
results are valid in an ASO setting. 
Furthermore, several studies focuse on 
survival or success cases only. Since we also 
include failed ASOs into consideration we 
assume to obtain other results. 
2.2.2 Education and performance 
Skills useful for entrepreneurs may be gained 
from education through the accumulation of 
mainly explicit knowledge (Davidsson and 
Honig, 2003). Yet, formal education is one 
component of human capital that has proved to 
give nonlinear and inconsistent effects of 
performance, growth and the exploitation of 
opportunities (Avermaete et al., 2004, Stuart 
and Abetti, 1990, Haber and Reichel, 2007, 
Davidsson and Honig, 2003, Bosma et al., 
2004, Mayer-Haug et al., 2013). Critics argue 
that positive effects of education is more a 
matter of signalling effects and status rather 
than the skills it gives a person (Dore, 1976). 
As such, judging a person's skills from 
education, which is partly what employment 
recruiters do, may be an unreliable and weak 
measure.  
Furthermore, studies assessing 
different types of education have been largely 
neglected, and is arguably an interesting topic 
of research. Although education is tightly 
linked to work experience, (i.e, having 
technical experience means you probably have 
technical education) studying the contribution 
education has on performance in isolation may 
provide new insights. It is especially valuable 
in cases where spin-offs are started by 
founders fresh out of school. By considering 
different types of education and their impact 
on performance, we expect to find that some 
types of education may have a greater impact 
on performance than others. While it is clear 
that technical education is needed, given the 
technical orientation of ASOs, it is unclear 
whether manegerial education will enhance the 
performance of an ASO.  
  
Type of education: Scholars tend to look at 
education believed to be most relevant for the 
ASO setting, namely managerial/economic 
and technical/scientific education (for example 
(Colombo and Grilli, 2005, Gimmon, 2010)). 
Findings from such studies are somewhat 
diverging. Colombo and Grilli (2009), Oakey 
(2003) and Ganotakis (2012) found a 
significant and positive effect of economic or 
managerial university education, whereas 
technical education has produced weaker 
although positive results, in predicting firm 
performance (Colombo and Grilli, 2009). 
Ganotakis (2012) actually found that technical 
education had a negative and significant effect 
on performance. They make a case for the 
issue of technical education on its own 
(meaning the individual has no other work 
experience or education) producing negative 
effects and that technical education needs to be 
complemented with other types of experience 
and/or education to become of value. It is 
possible that TMTs with a technical education 
can become too focused on product 
development and the technical side of the spin-
off, abandoning the commercial aspects, which 
can affect ASO performance in a negative 
way. Furthermore, to prove positive, the 
technical education may have to be very 
specifically related to the ASO’s activities. In 
general, managerial/economic education is 
found to have a stronger effect on performance 
compared to technical education. 
Managerial/economic education provides a 
person with business related skills that can 
prove advantageous even if education is not 
complemented with work experience. As 
research regarding the effect of technical 
education diverges, we propose that there is no 
effect, stated differently, the positive effects 
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balance the negative. The following 
hypotheses are thus proposed: 
 
2a: Managerial education in the top 
management team has a positive effect on 
academic spin-off performance. 
2b: Technical education in the top 
management teams has no effect on academic 
spin-off performance. 
 
Level of education: Several studies look at the 
level of education among entrepreneurs and 
give support to an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between education and ASO 
performance (Oakey, 2003, Ganotakis, 2012, 
Unger et al., 2011). Although some education 
may prove beneficial, too much education, 
meaning education above masters level, may 
be detrimental to performance. These studies 
suggest that individuals with very high levels 
of general, education (measured as either 
number of years in schooling or possession of 
PhD) might overestimate their abilities, 
thereby disregarding the importance of seeking 
additional information that could have lead to 
either new opportunities, better decisions or 
valuable contacts (Ucbasaran et al., 2008). In 
addition to adverse personality characteristics 
of highly educated, findings indicate that such 
people are more likely to want to stay in 
control of their ASOs, potentially threatening 
long term survival. Lastly, some scholar 
propose that high education corresponds to 
higher age, a family, a desire to do research 
and a higher perceived opportunity cost of 
venturing (Ganotakis, 2012, Unger et al., 
2011). Summed up, studies give considerable 
indications that TMTs with degrees above 
masters affects the performance of an ASO in 
a negative manner, and we thus put forward 
the following hypothesis: 
 
2c: PhDs within the top management team has 
a negative effect on academic spin-off 
performance. 
2.2.3 Presence of academic founder 
Most inventions are at an early stage when a 
spin-off is established (Shane, 2004). 
Furthermore, they tend to be based on the tacit 
knowledge of the academic founder (the key 
researcher(s) who worked on the project from 
the institution where the ASO originated 
from), suggesting that founder involvement is 
essential in the development of the spin-off 
(Shane, 2004). Following this, Knockaert et al. 
(2010) found that the transfer of tacit 
knowledge is more inclined to be successful if 
the academic founder is part of the 
entrepreneurial team, regardless if the product 
or technology is mainly based on explicit 
knowledge. In fact, spin-offs with the 
academic founder present are found to be less 
likely to fail (Nerkar and Shane, 2003), further 
indicating that having an academic founder 
affects performance positively. Even though 
the technology is made explicit in patents, the 
successful exploitation of the technology is 
likely to involve some tacit knowledge from 
the inventor (Shane, 2004). 
Overall literature seems to emphasize 
the importance of academic founder 
involvement, and the following hypothesis is 
put forward:  
 
3a: Academic founders present in the top 
management team at the academic spin-off’s 
inception will have a positive effect on 
performance.  
3 METHOD 
The methodical approach used in this article is 
driven by the chosen analytical tool. The 
dependent variable (DV) has been 
operationalized to be binary as has most of the 
independent variables (IVs), and thus they fit 
into a binary logistic regression model. It 
would have been possible to analyse the data 
using t-testing. However, this type of analysis 
does not take covariation between the IVs into 
consideration. As seen in section 2, previous 
theory indicates that some of the IVs may 
covariate and a simple t-test would not allow 
us to investigate this interesting and important 
covariation. 
A regression attempts to describe the 
dependence of the DV on the IVs; it implicitly 
assumes that there is a one-way causal effect 
from the IV to the DV. 
To summarize: Regression is the 
chosen technique in this article as it enables us 
to answer the research questions in a more 
satisfactory manner compared to other 
approaches, such as for example a t-test.  
 
This section is structured as follows: Firstly, to 
understand the context of the sample better, a 
thorough introduction of the FORNY-
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programme will be provided. Secondly, we 
will describe the comprehensive data gathering 
procedure. Next, we introduce the variables 
that were used in the regression analysis and 
provide some descriptive statistics. Finally, we 
will discuss the limitations associated with the 
chosen method.  
3.1 Sample context 
The dataset which forms the basis for the 
findings in this paper is based on the 
Norwegian FORNY-programme. FORNY was 
established in 1995 and is a governmentally 
funded research support programme within the 
Research Council of Norway. The first 
programme was closed in 2012 and replaced 
by a new program, FORNY2020. It is the main 
support programme for commercialization of 
publicly funded research in Norway. The 
programme is one of many initiatives which 
has led to increased attention to 
commercialization activities. Furthermore, in 
2003, universities were granted the intellectual 
property rights to research originating from the 
university, which earlier belonged to the 
researchers themselves. As a result of this, the 
largest research institutions in Norway 
established technology transfer offices 
(TTOs), acting as commercialisation agents for 
research and promoters for the formation of 
spin-off companies (Gulbrandsen and 
Rasmussen, 2012, Borlaug, 2009). 
The general objective of the FORNY-
programme is to increase wealth in Norway 
through the commercialization of research 
based business ideas. This includes increasing 
the number of ideas with sufficient value 
creation potential from researchers, 
stimulating realisation of potential business 
opportunities through new ventures or license 
agreements and lastly, increased and closer 
cooperation between commercialisation actors 
such as TTOs, research institutions, investors, 
entrepreneurs, industry and governmental 
authorities. Since 1995, the FORNY-
programme has generated 471 startups 
(Rasmussen et al., 2013). The accumulated 
value creation, which is calculated by adding 
up the accumulated operating result, wage 
costs and depreciation for all spin-offs, is 
estimated to pass 15 billion NOK in 2017 
(Rasmussen et al., 2013). Per 2012, more than 
one billion NOK has been invested through the 
FORNY-programme (Rasmussen, 2012).  
Until 2012 the FORNY-programme 
worked exclusively through TTOs. TTOs are 
either, or in combination, connected to 
universities, public or private research 
institutions, private research firms, science 
parks and incubators. TTOs register all ideas 
from the research institutions’ employees. 
Such a structuring has been an advantage 
when collecting data from the firms. However, 
since 2012 the programme has opened up for 
more funding being directed to the startups 
themselves. As this is a quite recent change, 
the effects remain to be seen.  
The information available through the 
FORNY-programme is unique as it comprises 
a list of research based spin-offs as well as 
data that is not normally readily available in 
other countries. Several arguments are put 
forward to justify the database as a suitable 
dataset for studying research based spin-offs in 
Norway; (i) Its comprehensive scope. As it 
includes most TTOs in Norway, this means 
that the database is likely to include data from 
the vast majority of research based spin-offs 
after 2003 (Rasmussen et al., 2013). (ii) It 
spans all high-technology research sectors, 
ranging from biotechnology/pharma, marine 
technology, energy/environment and 
information/communication sectors 
(Rasmussen et al., 2013). (iii) The database 
comprises firms from all geographical 
locations in Norway. Due to this, research can 
control for many external factors, including 
economic, cultural and environmental 
variables. We also take social capital factors 
into consideration. As all firms are affiliated 
with a TTO, one can assume that much of the 
TTO’s social capital is transferred to and 
exploited in the ASO.  
3.2 Data collection  
The data collection process was part of an 
extensive research project directed by Bodø 
Business School and the Norwegian 
University of Science and Technology 
(NTNU). The data gathering was performed in 
two steps. The first step relates to the data 
collection process on firm level, while the last 
step focuses on the individuals in each firm. 
These steps will be explained in separate 
sections.  
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3.2.1 Firm level data collection 
process 
In the first step a general template in Microsoft 
Office Excel was used to track the status of 
each FORNY spin-off. The format of the 
template was developed in an iterative process 
where an earlier version was tested and 
discarded. The main input to the template was 
information from the FORNY database, 
consisting of annual reports from the national 
business register1 and news articles extracted 
from the norwegian news archive Retriever. 
The news article archive covers both print and 
online media, and contains all news articles up 
until february 2013. Additional searches in 
Retriever were performed to uncover articles 
written after february 2013. Annual reports 
consist of three parts, namely the financial 
statements, notes to the financial statements 
and the board statement. The latter must 
include information such as an overview of 
what the firm does, the financial development 
of the firm, its R&D activities and 
prerequisites for further operations2. 
Additionally, the corporate announcements 
archive in the national business register, 
available on the register’s web pages, was used 
extensively, giving an overview of business 
enterprises activities such as business 
establishment, equity issues, board changes 
and changes in CEOs.  
The final template consisted of three 
sections; (i) A general overview of the 
business consisting of information about the 
research background, nature of the technology 
being commercialized, first international sales, 
first occurrence of VC, whether the business 
has been discontinued or acquired, occurrence !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Brønnøysundregistrene : http://brreg.no/ 
2 http://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/1998-07-17-
2 http://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/1998-07-17-
56/KAPITTEL_3#KAPITTEL_3 
of international subsidiaries, if software was a 
key product or service offering, whether 
products or services were based on 
biotechnology and/or pharmaceuticals were 
offered, and a summary of unexplained issues 
and areas for further investigation (ii) Changes 
in the company’s legal entity consisting of 
establishment, acquisitions, mergers, 
divestments, subsidiaries, change in names, 
other restructuring and other events (iii)The 
history of the firm on a year to year basis 
including financial status, business activities, 
new significant contracts, sales or customer 
agreements and an overview of the 10 largest 
owners (including background information and 
type of ownership).  
In total nine researchers and students 
tracked 100 FORNY spin-offs at the beginning 
of 2014. All completed templates were re-
checked in detail, ensuring consistency in the 
interpretation of data. 
Table 1 displays the year of 
establishment of the 100 spin-offs in the study. 
The majority of the spin-offs were established 
between 2000 - 2003, thus leaving 10 years of 
spin-off development to analyze. In fact, the 
average age of the ASOs in the sample is 9,5 
years. The initial goal for the spring 2014 was 
to cover all FORNY companies from 2001-
2003. This was not accomplished, and an 
average coverage of 68% was achieved, 
randomly sampled. Furthermore, companies 
were added to the data set randomly both from 
before 2001 and after 2003 to ensure resilience 
with regards to the time dimension. However, 
with the exception of one ASO established in 
late 1999, ASOs established before 2000 were 
not included in the data set. Annual reports 
were not delivered digitally before 2000 and 
were thus hard to come by. Furthermore, the 
structure of FORNY was changed in 2000, 
when it became an independent program 
within the Research Council (Borlaug, 2009). 
It was not until 2000 that it was specified that 
the main goal was to contribute to increased 
value creation based on research results. As 
the goal of the programme before 2000 was 
TABLE 1 - DISTRIBUTION OF FORNY SPIN-OFFS 
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less specific, several of the FORNY spin-offs 
would not fall in under the definition of an 
ASO as used in this article.  
 
 
3.2.2 Individual level data collection 
process 
The second data gathering step consisted of 
gathering data relevant for human capital and 
performance parameters and was based on the 
100 templates in the previous step. In order to 
operationalize the TMT we analysed the 
CEO(s) throughout the development of the 
spin-off. We rationalize the use of CEO due to 
the following reasons; (i) The CEO plays a 
unique and strong role in strategic decisions 
which in turn are influential on the 
development path and performance of the 
organisation (Offstein and Gnyawali, 2005). 
Besides having the overhead decision role, the 
CEO is also responsible for hiring employees 
and exercise leadership, which is arguably 
related to the performance of the firm (ii) As 
young firms tend to be small in terms of 
number of employees, CEOs are even more 
influential in ASOs compared to large firms, 
as they are heavily involved in daily 
operations, the coordination and execution of 
activities (Bruton et al., 1997, Miller and 
Toulouse, 1986, Wasserman, 2003) (iii) As the 
CEO reports to and advises the board of 
directors, he or she must have a detailed 
overview of all operations in the firm and thus, 
the CEO has overlapping knowledge and skills 
to all other members of the TMT (iv) 
Collecting quantitative data on the TMT would 
be very resource demanding as all the spin-
offs and TTOs would have to be contacted. 
This would have been outside the scope of our 
master thesis. Furthermore, information about 
CEOs is openly available in the national 
business registrer, where all companies are 
obliged to inform about changes in the CEO. 
Due to the first three points above, the 
human capital of the CEO is evidently the 
most important and influential factor of the 
TMT. In some young firms, one may even 
experience that the CEO is the only 
“representative” of the TMT. The discussion 
above supports the operationalization of TMT 
through the use of CEO. However, there are 
some drawbacks related to this 
operationalization, which will be discussed in 
section 3.4.  
In order to extract relevant data not 
covered by the general template used in step 1, 
we developed a second Excel template. The 
measures that were tracked in this template are 
explained in detail in 3.3.2, since they form the 
basis of our predictor variables. We also 
tracked ASO income and net result on a year 
to year basis. In order to collect necessary 
empirical data to analyze hypothesis 1 and 2 
we registered the names of all the CEOs for 
each FORNY firm on a year to year basis. 
CEOs that held the position for less than half a 
year were not registered, as we assumed that it 
takes time to get acquainted with the ASO and 
for knowledge transfer to take place. Stated 
differently, it likely takes time before a new 
CEO can influence the direction of the ASO. 
Furthermore, this allowed us to register only 
one CEO per year, which was our chosen time 
unit. Since we tracked the ASOs on a yearly 
basis in the first template, it seemed natural to 
choose the same time unit when tracking 
changes in CEOs. In order to collect necessary 
empirical data to analyze hypothesis 3 we 
extracted the overview of firm shareholders 
from the general template for the first two 
years after firm establishment. All 
shareholders classified as founders were 
further investigated. To summarize; when 
tracking the CEO we have looked at the 
process of ASO development by taking into 
account that CEOs change, i.e we do not only 
look at the initial or current CEO, but track all 
changes. It is important to emphasise that it 
would have been possible to investigate how 
the initial CEO affected ASO performance, but 
we wish to investigate how changes over time 
impact performance. When investigating the 
academic founder we looked at the ASO at the 
time close to ASO establishment (two years) 
as we are interested in the initial knowledge 
transfer. We chose to look at two years of data 
to ensure that the founders were committed to 
the ASO.  
Data on founders and CEOs was 
mainly collected using LinkedIn Recruiter, 
companies’ web pages3, and news articles 
from Retriever. For each firm, we first 
investigated if the founders were academic 
founders, meaning that they had previously !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 For ASOs that had failed, the internet archive 
web.archive.org was used to access deleted web 
pages 
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worked on the research project or research 
institution where the ASO originated from. 
Subsequently we tracked the background of all 
the CEOs and academic founders as outlined 
in 3.3.2, by specifying yes, no or unknown for 
each variable. Stated differently, we did not 
register human capital elements in number of 
years but rather looked at the presence of such 
elements. This poses some limitations, which 
will be discussed in section 3.4. During this 
step we also described the type of education or 
work experience that each CEO had as 
comments. To verify that all three authors 
were consistent in interpreting data we started 
by tracking the same ASO individually. The 
results were then compared and discussed. The 
remaining 99 ASOs were divided among the 
three authors and tracked individually.  
Finally, we went through all the 100 
templates together to ensure that ambiguities 
and discrepancies were eliminated. We 
actively used the aforementioned comments to 
ensure that we had treated different types of 
educations and work experiences in a 
consistent way. All the unknown elements 
were further investigated. During this process, 
16 spin-offs were excluded from the data set. 
The two main reasons for this were: (i) 
Insufficient information about key people or 
the background of the spin-off was found 
(seven cases) and (ii) Did not fit our definition 
of an ASO, notably due to an unclear or 
complete lack of a scientific basis (nine cases). 
Furthermore, at this point we also evaluated 
the performance of each ASO as outlined in 
3.3.1. The performance was marked using 
binary numbers, where 1 signified a performer 
and 0 signified a failure. If applicable, we 
registered the year of failure or the year of 
acquisition by merger (see 3.3.1). CEOs from 
the year of failure or acquisition by merger and 
CEOS from years after these events were 
deleted. This was done to ensure that we did 
not track human capital’s effect on 
performance after the outcome of the ASO had 
been categorized. At this point most of the 
unknown factors had been eliminated. Next, 
we translated all the answers (yes, no and 
unknown) to binary numbers for the CEOs, 
where 1 was used for yes and 0 was used for 
no and unknown. Unknown typically occurred 
when we were not able to find all details about 
a persons background on LinkedIn or from 
other sources. If we found no indications of 
such experience from these other sources we 
assumed they did not possess it. With regards 
to the academic founder, we registered how 
many academic founders that were present in 
each ASO, and how many of these that had 
commercial experience.  
3.3 Variables 
In this section we will first present the 
dependent variable (DV), secondly the 
independent variables (IVs), and thirdly, the 
control variables (CVs). For each type of 
variable we will explain how it was 
operationalized and the criteria that was used. 
Towards the end we provide descriptive 
statistics of the variables.  
3.3.1 Dependent variable  
As performance is the dependent variable in 
our data analysis, a short presentation of how 
other scholar define the term follows. 
The aspect of success and 
performance is well addressed. However, as 
Rasmussen (2012) and Hayter (2011) points 
out there is limited consensus on the unit of 
analysis, and which measures to use when 
seeking to find a definition. Many scholars 
rely on one-dimensional measures which are 
easily accessible, such as accounting based 
indicators, number of employees, sales 
numbers and occurrence of IPOs. The 
drawback of these measures is that they can 
give false perceptions of reality as 
performance is usually a function of several 
variables. Furthermore, in early stage 
technology companies, such indicators are 
inappropriate (Shane and Toby, 2002). We 
seek to overcome this limitation and base our 
characterization of a performing ASO on 
several variables. Furthermore, we look at 
performance indicators that predict future 
success as well as the opposite - indicators that 
predict a likely future fail. By taking indicators 
of different nature into account we seek to 
overcome errors related to (i) ASOs long and 
extremely capital intensive development times 
and the fact that they remain rather small 
before they start to grow (ii) The fact that 
performance and success is assessed 
differently depending on which stakeholder 
you ask, i.e, academic entrepreneurs may 
consider non-financial milestones such as 
technology diffusion as measures of higher 
performance. The criteria for classifying firms 
as performers or failures are further described 
below. It is important to emphasise that an 
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overall assessment was done for each ASO. 
We investigated the activity through the 
ASO’s entire lifespan (from inception until the 
end of 20124) in order to decide which of the 
two categories were the most suitable for the 
ASO in question.  
The first aspect that was investigated 
was whether or not the ASO had been 
acquired. In fact, 18.1% of the ASOs in the 
sample were acquired. As most of the ASOs in 
the sample had existed for around or less than 
10 years, many were still in an early phase, 
possibly too early for acquisition to be an 
option. Furthermore, two types of acquisitions 
were regarded. First, the ASO could be 
acquired and kept as an independent entity. 
The second type of acquisition refers to ASOs 
that were acquired and merged into the buying 
entity. For each acquisition we checked if it 
was distressed, meaning that the acquisition 
was a “last resort” for the ASO. If no 
comments related to the acquisition were 
present in the general template we checked the 
annual reports. If the statement from the board 
indicated that it was distressed, we classified 
the ASO as a failure. For those that were not 
distressed (5% of the total sample) the 
following steps were performed; Those that 
were merged into the buying entity were 
classified as “performers” in the year of the 
acquisition. Human capital parameters were 
not tracked the following years. This is due to 
the issue of human capital of the buying entity, 
which could possibly influence the ASO 
strongly and accordingly, influence our results. 
Furthermore, we did not have access to the 
annual reports of these companies. We 
continued to track the ASOs that were 
acquired and kept as independent entities as 
described below.  
In the second and final step we 
assessed the activity levels in the ASOs. First, 
we looked into ASOs that had been 
discontinued and marked as failures. However, 
we still assessed their activity level to see if 
they ceased operations and were de facto 
failures before the ASO was legally 
discontinued. This means that if a firm showed 
no activity the last two years before legal !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Even though the latest annual reports were from 
2012, we track firm activity through the national 
business registry until 2014. Ie. if a firm 
discontinued in january 2014, this was considered. 
discontinuation, it was classified a failure two 
years before discontinuation. By investigating 
the year of actual failure we are able to adjust 
for this when we tracked the CEOs of the 
failed ASOs. If we were to track the human 
capital for a CEO in an ASO that is de facto 
failed, this would affect our results.  
For the remaining ASOs, we first 
considered the income levels and net profit for 
all the years of operation. We looked at 
changes in the economic trend. ASOs that 
increased their activity and net profit over 
several years were classified as performers, 
counted from the final year of observation. 
However, if the yearly expenditure was less 
than 50 000 NOK for three consecutive years, 
we marked the ASO as a failure in the first 
year this occurred. This amount of money was 
chosen as it indicates that expenses only 
covers the services of accountants and similar, 
thus indicating that there is limited activity in 
the ASO. Furthermore, ASOs that had an 
expenditure of 50 000 - 250 000 NOK in three 
or more consecutive years were further 
investigated to establish whether they were in 
the process of ceasing operations, and if so, 
when it was decided. The upper limit was 
chosen at it roughly translates to a 50% part 
time employment of one person for one year. 
In these cases the statements of the board were 
considered. By looking at the statements from 
the year before the expenditure diminished as 
well as the statements from the years with low 
expenditure, we were able to classify the ASO 
as either (on its way to) performance or as a 
failure. We used statements of the board to 
determine which year the ASO failed, as future 
prospects would often be remarked.  
This means that firms that (i) were 
discontinued or had gone bankrupt (14%) or 
(ii) showed minimum activity over the last 
three years (10%) or (iii) underwent a 
panicked acquisition (15%), were classified as 
failures. It should be noted that “living dead” 
ASOs, ASOs that exist as a legal entity but 
have ceased all activity, were classified as 
failures. To summarize, 39% of the ASOs in 
our sample were failures. 
3.3.2 Independent variables  
The IVs were used to track human capital 
parameters relevant to our research questions. 
In total there were 167 CEOs and 165 
academic founders in the 84 ASOs in our 
sample, resulting in an average of two CEOs 
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and two academic founders per ASO. To 
ensure consistency in how the IVs were treated 
we developed a set of criteria for each IV. 
Furthermore, some general criteria was set. 
Employments with a duration of less than half 
a year were not registered, assuming that it 
takes time to acquire skills and knowledge. 
Moreover, industry-specific experience, thus 
experience which is directly relevant for the 
ASO in question, was not tracked separately as 
such specificity was hard to judge with the 
available data.  
As previously mentioned, we tracked 
whether an individual possessed (1) or did not 
possess (0) the different types of experience. 
Moreover, this was done for all the CEOs. 
This information was used to calculate an 
average CEO for each ASO. For IVs relating 
to the CEO, the inputs to the model were 
constructed as averages. For each CEO, we 
had registered the number of years the position 
was held. To calculate the average for each IV 
we first multiplied the number of years each 
CEO had held the position as CEO, by the 
experience or education the CEO held (1 or 0). 
These were calculated for all the CEOs and 
added together. By dividing this sum on the 
number of years of operation of the ASO we 
were able to get an average CEO for each 
ASO. From now on the average CEO will be 
referred to as ACEO. Each ASO thus has an 
ACEO for all of the IVs.  
 There is one distinction between 
experience and education which this 
calculation does not take into consideration. 
Education is finite in time and its presence is 
easy to measure. Experience, on the other 
hand, is something that is gained over time, 
meaning a CEO with 10 years of experience 
should have acquired more human capital than 
a CEO with one year of experience. This is a 
limitation of the chosen method, and will be 
treated in section 3.4.  
 
First, each type of experience will be presented 
as well as the criteria that was used to judge 
each case.  
 Entrepreneurial work experience 
measures if the CEO was previously employed 
in, or owned a startup. A startup was defined 
as a firm that had existed for less than 10 years 
at the time of the employment or ownership. 
Lawton Smith and Ho (2006) demonstrated 
that it generally takes at least 10 years before 
the rate of growth of spin-off companies start 
to accelerate. The limit of 10 years was chosen 
as we did not want to include experience from 
spin-off companies in the growth stage, as it 
can be assumed that procedures have been set 
in place that reduce the influence or 
importance of the employees’ human capital. 
Experience from companies such as personal 
consulting companies, real estate management 
companies and holding companies was not 
included even if they had existed for less than 
10 years. This distinction was done for three 
reasons. Firstly, in personal consulting 
companies the “product” being sold is the 
consultant’s knowledge, which we did not 
consider as relevant for this type of 
experience. Secondly, in real estate 
management companies the nature of the tasks 
are more managerial than “entrepreneurial”, 
and they are typically driven by tax concerns. 
Thirdly, as private holding companies are 
concerned with ownership, the nature of the 
tasks are more managerial than 
entrepreneurial. On a different note, those that 
became CEO after having worked in a 
different position in the same ASO were 
registered to have entrepreneurial experience. 
However, learning from the position as CEO 
in the ASO was not registered. In other words, 
even though a CEO remained in the CEO 
position for several years, he or she were not 
rewarded with entrepreneurial experience in 
our coding system. This limitation will be 
discussed in section 3.4. 24% of the ASOs had 
CEOs with prior entrepreneurial work 
experience. 
Commercial work experience 
measures previous employment with 
marketing and sales related tasks, as well as 
contact with customers, suppliers and 
manufacturers. Employments where it was 
stated explicitly that a person was responsible 
for such tasks were registered. Furthermore, 
work experience from TTOs, seed funding 
companies and other types of investment 
companies was also registered as commercial 
experience. Previous employments within 
project management were also registered as 
commercial experience as it was assumed that 
the project management tasks would include 
extensive contact with suppliers and 
customers. 45 % of the ASOs had CEOs with 
this type of human capital. 
Technical/scientific work experience 
measures if the CEO previously has had an 
employment typically dealing with technical 
15 
or scientific tasks. If a CEO held a technical 
PhD degree, the CEO would automatically get 
technical/scientific work experience as it was 
assumed that technical work had to be 
performed in order to receive the PhD degree. 
Almost 70% of all ASOs had CEOs with 
technical work experience. 
Managerial work experience measures 
whether the CEO previously had an 
employment with responsibility for managing 
other people or managing a firm. It had to be 
stated explicitly in the job description that the 
CEO had responsibility for other employees or 
was a leader of some kind. A lot of the time 
the CEO would have worked as a project 
manager or leader. Additionally, work 
experience from TTOs, seed funding 
companies and other types of investment 
companies was also classified as managerial 
work as such employments most often require 
that the person has to take an active and 
managerial role in start-up companies. The 
number of employees and level at which they 
were managed was not specified. In fact, in 
most cases such information was not readily 
available. 50% of the ASOs had CEOs with 
managerial work experience.  
Technical education measures if the 
CEO holds a bachelor degree or higher from a 
technical area of study. 81% of the ASOs had 
CEOs with some sort of technical education. 
Managerial education measures if the 
CEO holds a bachelor degree or more from 
managerial, business or economic studies. 
23% of the ASOs had CEOs with this type of 
education.  
Phd measures if the CEO holds a Phd 
degree, which was the case for 34% of the 
sample. This high occurrence of PhD degrees 
will be commented in 3.3.4. 
Academic founder refers to founders 
of the ASO (classified as those who own 
shares within the first two years after 
establishment) that worked as key researchers 
on the project or institution where the ASO 
originated from. 86% of the ASOs in the 
sample had one or more academic founders.  
Academic founder with commercial 
work experience measures if an academic 
founder, as described above, has commercial 
work experience. This was the case for 18% of 
the ASOs. 
3.3.3 Control variables 
Four factors are used as CVs. The justification 
for this follows.  
Venture Capital: VC is used as a CV 
as we are interested in the independent effect 
of experience and education, and thus want to 
control for the effect on performance arising 
from resources obtained through VC 
financing. Access to VC is a key driver of 
ASO performance (Colombo and Grilli, 2009). 
In fact, receiving VC financing is found to be 
associated with superior growth when 
compared to companies that did not receive 
such financing (Gimmon, 2010). Based on the 
literature we expect that this variable is highly 
and positively correlated with ASO 
performance. As illustrated in table 3, a strong 
correlation between ASO performance and 
receiving VC funding was found. Furthermore, 
48% of the ASOs in the sample received VC 
funding. 
Receiving VC funding is also closely 
linked to human capital. Several scholars give 
support to the issue of VCs investing in people 
with certain types of human capital, such as 
managerial skills derived from either 
education or work experience (Colombo and 
Grilli, 2010, Gurdon and Samsom, 2010, 
Gimmon, 2010). As our study investigates 
human capital’s effect on performance over 
time, it is necessary to control for the effect of 
receiving VC, as receiving VC has a high and 
positive impact on performance. Furthermore, 
the particular human capital coveted by VCs 
will most likely be artificially inflated in the 
model if not controlled for. Another reason to 
use VC as a CV is based on Colombo and 
Grilli (2009) findings which indicate that new 
technology based firms (NTBF) that receive 
VC funding experience higher growth 
independently of the founders’ human capital. 
This was explained by the coaching function 
of VCs, improved financials as well as the 
signalising effects it gave to other stakeholders 
(Colombo and Grilli, 2009).  
Bio/pharma: ASOs in the biotechnical 
and pharmaceutical industry differ from those 
in other industries as they typically have 
longer product development times and 
potential for significantly higher returns. 
Stringent requirements for clinical trials and 
verification causes longer and more resource 
demanding development periods compared to 
other industries (Mustar et al., 2006). 
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Accordingly, we expect this variable to be 
negatively correlated with ASO performance 
as our observation window of less than 10 
years is too short to capture the potential for 
higher returns. This expected negative 
correlation appears to be correct, as can be 
seen in table 3. Moreover, 23% of the ASOs 
operate in the Bio/pharma industry. Thus it is 
important to control for their extended 
development time. 
Software: Firms in the software 
industry have faster and less resource intensive 
development periods compared to those in 
other industries (Druilhe and Garnsey, 2004). 
Since they differ from other ASOs with 
regards to their resource needs, we expect 
ASOs based on software to behave differently. 
35% of the ASOs operate in the software 
industry.  
CEO change per year: Frequent CEO 
changes in a firm are often interpreted as a 
sign of distress (Daily and Dalton, 1995). On 
the other hand, when VCs invest they also tend 
to change the CEO (Gimmon, 2010). 
However, we expected that the latter will have 
a small effect as not all ASOs in the sample 
received VC funding, and this only accounts 
for a small portion of the CEO changes. Thus, 
we expect this variable to be negatively 
correlated with ASO performance. As 
illustrated in table 3, the correlation was 
negative. In line with the above argumentation, 
a positive correlation was found between CEO 
changes per year and receiving VC funding.  
3.3.4 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 displays some descriptive statistics of 
the variables used in this study. Relatively 
high or low percentages will be commented.  
Interestingly, 86% of the ASOs have 
at least one academic founder present at 
inception, which may indicate that academic 
inventors are important in deciding if a 
technology or research result should be 
commercialized through the establishment of 
an ASO.  
Furthermore, it can be noted that 81% 
of the ASOs have CEOs with technical 
education, and 70% of all ASOs have CEOs 
with technical work experience. A possible 
explanation is that there an abundance of 
inventor CEOs. Actually, 42% of FORNY 
spin-offs had inventors as the current CEO 
(Borlaug, 2009). It may be that the occurrence 
of inventor CEOs is higher in our sample. This 
may be attributed to the fact that we look at all 
CEOs as opposed to current the CEO. Another 
reason can be that academic founders hire 
CEOs with a similar mindset as them, put 
differently, it may be that they prefer CEOs 
with a similar background to theirs. 
Moreover, 34% of the ASOs have 
CEOs holding a PhD degree. In line with the 
above, this high percentage may be attributed 
to having academics or researchers as CEOs, 
as they often have PhD degrees.  
 Lastly, the occurrence of one the CVs 
TABLE 2 - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
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is high, namely VC. 48% of the ASOs 
received VC funding. This is almost the 
double of what Borlaug (2009) found to be the 
case based on UK evidence, which showed 
that 25% of ASOs received this type of 
funding. The percentage may be unnaturally 
high due to the nature of one of the funds 
which was registered as a VC fund, Såkorn 
Invest Midt-Norge. This was a seed fund 
which typically invested smaller amounts in 
several ASOs, thus the fund had a different 
profile from a typical VC fund. This could 
have been adjusted for by changing the 
variable which refers to first occurrence of VC 
in step 1, as explained in 3.2.1. However, we 
chose not to do this. We assume that this seed 
fund company used a set of criteria in order to 
decide if an ASO should receive money, thus 
indicating that the ASOs that receive this seed 
funding were more likely to perform better 
than those who did not receive funding. As 
such, it is in line with the reasoning used when 
explaining why we used VC as a CV.  
3.4 Methodical limitations 
As shown in the above sections, several 
simplifications and operationalizations have 
been made in order to be able to test the 
hypotheses quantitatively. Limitations related 
to our chosen method will now be presented. 
LinkedIn: Although LinkedIn mostly 
proved to be an excellent source of 
information, there is still an important 
limitation with regards to the incompleteness 
of the information available on LinkedIn. The 
CEOs and academic founders’ backgrounds 
were occasionally incomplete, which led to 
some assumptions on work experience and 
education based on available information. 
There is also an argument to be made whether 
or not LinkedIn can be assessed as a 
trustworthy source of information as people 
provide the content for their personal page 
themselves. Furthermore, they likely have a 
clear purpose to make it available on 
LinkedIn; to attract job offers and other 
interesting opportunities. In fact, several 
individuals omitted information about CEO 
experience from ASOs that failed (on 
LinkedIn), information we found in the 
national business register. A rather expected 
but important data gathering limitation is that a 
number of professors and researchers did not 
have a LinkedIn profile. In these cases we 
assumed that they stayed in the same position 
since finishing their studies unless the results 
from a web search contradicted this. In order 
to limit the consequences of this limitation we 
supplemented and cross checked information 
through web searches.  
Annual reports: Overall, the annual 
reports were a valuable source of information. 
However, several of the statements of the 
board were very short and did not include 
updated information about the status of the 
ASO. On some occasions they were simply 
copy pasted from the previous year. To some 
extent we were able to correct for this 
limitation by studying the financial statements 
and comparing them to previous years.  
Learning: Learning was not taken into 
consideration. Some CEOs held the position 
since ASO establishment, yet the experience 
gained from the earlier years was not 
registered in later years. However, if they were 
CEOs twice in the same ASO, with an interim 
CEO, we registered the experience gained 
from the first period. Ideally we would have 
treated the two cases in the same way. 
Overlap in work experience: Some 
types of previous employment were attributed 
several types of work experience. For 
example, work experience from TTOs, seed 
funding companies and other types of 
investment companies would lead to both 
managerial and commercial work experience, 
which may influence the results.   
Binary variables: Our choice of using 
binary variables poses some limitations. 
Education is finite in time and it can be easily 
measured if a CEO has a bachelor, master or 
PhD degree. However, there may be 
differences in the quality of the education from 
different education institutions, which the use 
of binary numbers does not account for. 
International rankings of universities could 
have been used to adjust for this. Experience, 
on the other hand, is gained over time. I.e a 
CEO with experience as Head of Sales of a 
large corporation for a decade will receive the 
same experience as a CEO which has worked 
in phone sales for a year. It would be natural to 
assume that the former would have a 
“stronger” experience than the latter, due to 
both industry specificity and duration. Thus, 
we could have strengthened our method by 
taking industry specificity into account as well 
as using continuous, as opposed to binary, 
variables.  
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Types of education: We did not track 
general education. On some occasions a CEO 
would have an educational background not 
covered by the two categories that were 
tracked, which may impact the results. 
Furthermore, we did not specify whether at 
PhD was technical, managerial or other, 
however we observed that the majority were 
technical/scientific PhDs. Finally, business, 
education and managerial educations were all 
registered as “managerial education”. This 
grouping was chosen as there may be overlaps 
in the various types of education, and it would 
have required that we checked the curriculum 
of the education (if it was still offered) in order 
to ensure consistency in the grouping. 
Moreover, on a few occasions people on 
LinkedIn would just state the school (the 
Norwegian school of economics and BI 
Norwegian Business School were most 
commonly stated) and level of education, 
without specifying the degree, thus making it 
difficult to verify the curriculum. It may be 
that there are differences within this grouping.  
Path dependency: While we weighted 
the CEOs’ experience and education with the 
number of years they held the position, we did 
not give more weight to the first CEOs. 
Arguably the decisions made by the first 
CEO(s) impacts the future of the ASO. Ideally 
we would have weighted the first CEO(s) to 
correct for the inferred path dependency. The 
required analysis techniques to operationalize 
the dynamics of the time dimension was 
outside the scope of this master thesis, and 
accordingly was not done. 
Timing: By calculating an ACEO we 
take difference in human capital of the various 
CEOs into consideration, and thus 
acknowledge that differences inferred over 
time matter. However, we do not take into 
consideration the timing of these human 
capital differences. This is an interesting area 
for further research which will be described in 
section 7.  
 Active academic founder: Although 
the presence of academic founder at inception 
was registered, we have no way of knowing if 
the academic founder took an active part in the 
TMT. Our analysis is based on the assumption 
that the academic founder is actively involved 
in the ASO. However, this was not possible to 
measure quantitatively with the available data.  
Definition of performance and failure: 
The way performers and failures are defined 
may impact the results. ASOs that have 
considerable activity are defined as 
performing. However, they may still fail in a 
close future. Moreover, with only 10 years of 
data it is hard to see if any of the ASOs have 
become highly successful. For example, in our 
sample there is only one IPO. Furthermore, the 
fact that we did not have annual reports for 
2013 poses a limitation as we lack the 
information to judge the most recent status and 
activity level of the ASO. However, the 
consequences of this limitation were reduced 
by checking if the ASO had been discontinued 
in the national business register later than 
2012. The ASO’s web pages were also used to 
see if there were any indications of a change in 
activity level.  
VC as a CV: The fact that we used VC 
as a CV is a limitation as receiving VC is 
related to human capital factors. Even though 
we chose to build the model in this way we 
could have built it differently by arguing that 
human capital is vital for receiving VC 
funding. Access to VC funding will affect 
performance, accordingly human capital that 
helped secure this funding indirectly affects 
performance.  
4. ANALYSIS 
In this section we outline the data analysis 
method. It was performed using binary logistic 
regression. Utilizing logistic regression makes 
it possible to create a statistical model which 
explains how each of the IVs affect our DV 
(ASO performance), thus enabling us to test 
whether the hypotheses derived in section 2.2 
are supported.  
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Having created a model, it is also critical to 
test to what extent the model fits the data. 
Among the several tests available, we chose to 
use the Nagelkerke R Square test and the 
Hosmer and Lemeshow test. Nagelkerke R 
Square is a measure for how well the statistical 
model fits the data and is useful as the DV is 
binary. The Hosmer and Lemeshow-test is a 
similar test, however it assesses if the observed 
IVs match the expected IVs in subgroups of 
the model. By using these two tests and 
common statistical evaluation tools like Chi-
square and log-likelihood we can thoroughly 
asses the validity of the model suggested by 
the regression.  
To interpret the created model we are 
using odds ratio (OR) and p-value. OR is a 
measure of the association between an IV and 
the DV. The OR represents the odds that the 
DV will occur given a particular IV, compared 
to the odds of the outcome occurring in the 
absence of that IV. An OR above one means 
that the IV has a positive effect on the DV, 
while an OR below one means that the 
presence of this variable will have a negative 
effect on performance. The OR also has a 
significance measure tied to it. This indicator 
(p-value) explains the probability of the effect 
observed occurring by chance. The closer to 
zero, the more certain one can be that the IV 
has structural predictive power to the DV. The 
limit for significance typically used in social 
sciences is 0.2 (Field, 2009). Anything above 
this implies the high chance for random 
variation and therefore the lack of support of 
the hypothesis.  
Before performing the regression the 
possible existence of multicollinearity 
problems has to be ruled out (Freund and 
Wilson, 1998). Variables in the final model 
may appear statistically insignificant even 
though they are significant due to high 
correlation between two or more of the IVs 
(Field, 2009). First we will investigate how the 
variables correlate with each other. Lastly, the 
regression is presented. 
4.1 Correlation matrix analysis 
The correlation matrix makes no a priori 
assumption as to whether or not one variable is 
dependent of others. The matrix only gives an 
estimate to the degree of association between 
the variables. As seen in the correlation matrix 
(table 3), VC funding has a significant, but 
moderate, correlation (<0.48) with 
performance, while the other CVs and IVs 
demonstrate weak correlations (<0.2) with the 
DV. While no single variable (excluding VC) 
seems to significantly affect performance 
independently, it is possible to reveal the effect 
of each variable when analysed in a regression 
system. However, for the regression to 
produce significant results it is vital that all 
correlations are below the 0.8 standard used by 
many in social sciences (Field, 2009). This 
indicates that the dataset has no 
multicollinearity problems that will affect the 
regression.  
There are four correlations worth 
noting; (i) Technical education and technical 
work experience (0.567); this correlation is not 
surprising as it stands to reason that a person 
with technical education quite often will get a 
technical job and that a technical job requires a 
technical education. Situations where CEOs 
are fresh out of school or have gone straight 
into commercial/managerial jobs might 
explain dynamics working against the 
correlation (ii) Managerial work experience 
and commercial work experience (0.736); 
TABLE 3 - CORRELATION MATRIX 
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Quite often managerial work will also have a 
commercial component to their duties (ie. talk 
to customers, and suppliers) especially in the 
case of smaller firms. (iii) Entrepreneurial 
work experience and commercial work 
experience (0.614); The same argument as 
above applies here. When you are an 
entrepreneur you often have to do multiple 
tasks in the company and arguably market 
related tasks are one of them. (iv) 
Entrepreneurial work experience and 
managerial work experience (0.536); This 
correlation is also explained as quite often 
entrepreneurs will have to do managerial work 
in their start-up. Even though all correlation-
values are below the 0.8 limit, some of the 
highest valued variables may exhibits weak 
signs of multicollinearity. Due to this, they 
have been payed special attention to in the 
subsequent data analysis.  
 
4.2 Regression analysis 
To investigate further whether 
multicollinearity problems exists, the variance 
inflation factors (VIF) were calculated for all 
IVs. With a maximum in the dataset of 3.3, the 
VIF scores were significantly below the 
widely accepted threshold of 10 (Kutner et al., 
2005). Considering VIF scores combined with 
the study of table 3 leads us to conclude that 
the dataset has no multicollinearity problems 
that will be problematic when interpreting the 
results.  
The hypotheses look at two different 
contexts; H1 and H2 investigates how the 
ASOs develop over time due to the influence 
of the CEO while H3 looks at whether the 
academic founders’ presence at the inception 
of the ASO has an effect on performance. 
When regression is used for analyzing data, 
the context of the IVs need to be the same 
(Kutner et al., 2005), leading us to perform 
two separate regressions for H1/H2 and H3. 
With regards to the CVs, “CEO changes per 
year” is left out in H3. This is logical as the 
regression looks at the ASO’s inception, thus 
compensating for how rapidly an ASO 
changes CEOs during its lifetime is irrelevant. 
When performing the regression the IVs were 
sorted into groups. In order to observe the IV’s 
influence on the model in detail, these groups 
were added to the regression in steps. The two 
regression procedures are described below.  
4.2.1 CEO regression 
Variables were divided into three groups as 
presented in table 4. The first group consists of 
CVs, the second group comprises IVs related 
to work experience and the last group consists 
of IVs relating to educational background.  
 
 
TABLE 5 - CEO REGRESSION 
TABLE 4 - GROUPS USED IN THE CEO REGRESSION 
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Table 5 presents the CEO regression. The table 
displays each of the partial regressions and 
shows how the p-values and ORs of the IVs 
change when other groups are added. Table 5 
also shows how well the model fits the data as 
each group is added to the model. Step 4 
includes all variables and is the final model 
used to answer the hypotheses. Group 2 and 3 
were separately added to group 1 (CVs) in the 
regression in order to observe how each group 
interacted with the CVs. Each of these partial 
models got acceptable Nagelkerke R Square 
and Hosmer and Lemeshow scores (step 2 and 
3). Moreover, when all groups were included 
in a larger and more complete model (step 4) 
we observed a significant increase in both 
Nagelkerke R Square and Hosmer and 
Lemeshow. The Chi-square and -2 Log 
likelihood coefficients suggest that both 
groups of IVs significantly contribute to the 
model.  
 
 Although the p-values and ORs 
fluctuated, their overall influence on the model 
(negative or positive effect on performance) 
stayed the same through each step, with two 
exceptions; (i) Commercial work experience 
went from an OR of 1.058, indicating no 
effect, in step 2 to a negative effect 
(OR=0.650) in step 4. This implies that when 
only work experiences are analysed by the 
regression commercial work experience has no 
impact. However, allowing for covariation 
with education components, commercial 
experience has a negative impact on 
performance (ii) Technical education went 
from not having an effect in step 3 
(OR=1.027) to having a positive effect in step 
4 (OR=1.929). This has a similar explanation 
as the above. When the regression looks on 
how education in isolation affects performance 
technical education seems to have no impact. 
However, when the regression considers both 
work experience and education and their 
effects on performance, the contribution from 
technical education becomes positive, thus 
indicating a covariation between these two 
groups. It is worth noting that neither 
commercial work experience, nor technical 
education has p-values that make them 
significant in the model, so although these 
changes are interesting it is not at a level of 
significance where we can draw any 
concluding remarks. 
When adding the two groups together 
two IVs and one CV got a decrease in p-value, 
i.e an increase in significance. The decrease in 
PhD (down 0.11) can be explained by a strong 
correlation with technical work experience that 
indicates a covariation with one or several 
work variables. Similarly, the decrease in 
managerial work experience (down 0.08) can 
be explained by a strong correlation with 
managerial education that indicates a 
covariation with one or several work variables. 
Bio/pharma has a steady reduction in p-value 
(down 0.185) and in the OR (down 0.259) 
when the two other groups are added. This 
indicates that this variable has some 
covariation with both groups. 
Correlations between the groups 
(education and work experience) appears to 
have a positive effect on the model as each 
group adds to the fit and predictive power of 
the model. The regression in Table 5 classifies 
81% correctly, which is significantly higher 
than the 60.1% baseline classification. Where 
baseline classification refers to the blind 
prediction of an ASO as “performing”, this 
being the most common outcome in the 
dependent variable. As 60.1% of our sample is 
classified as “performers”, the baseline 
classification is set to 60.1%. 
4.2.2 Academic founder regression 
Variables were divided into two groups, as 
seen in table 6.The first group consists of CVs, 
while the second contains IVs related to the 
presence of an academic founder at ASO 
inception. 
 
TABLE 6 - GROUPS USED IN THE ACADEMIC 
FOUNDER REGRESSION 
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When the first group was added to the model 
the variables acted as expected. Bio/pharma 
affect the firms performance negatively, while 
obtaining VC funding is highly positive. 
Software appears not to have a significant 
effect. When adding the second group, the 
CVs still behaved as expected with only slight 
variations in their OR. Both VC and 
Bio/Pharma became more significant when 
group 2 was added. This indicates that these 
two control variables has some covariation 
with the founders components. Also worth 
noting is that when the second group was 
added one can observe a significant increase in 
both Hosmer and Lemeshow, Nagelkerke R 
Square, Chi-square and log-likelihood-scores. 
This increase in scores suggest that the group 
of IVs contributed to the predictive power of 
the model. The regression in table 7 has a 
correct classification of 75%, which is 
significantly higher than the 60.1% baseline 
classification.  
5. RESULTS AND 
DISCUSSION 
Based on the binary logistic regression we 
performed, we are able to assess our 
hypotheses. We will present and subsequently 
discuss whether or not we have found support 
for the hypothesis. Results that are not 
significant will also be discussed, thus taking 
the direction indicated (given by the OR) into 
consideration. First, we investigate the work 
experience related hypotheses. Secondly, we 
investigate the education related hypotheses. 
Thirdly, we assess the effect of the presence of 
the academic founder. Finally, we investigate 
the inter linkedness between these three 
variables by providing some overall 
considerations. Since the hypotheses have 
been tested on our operationalization of the 
TMT, the CEO, the discussion revolves around 
the CEO.  
5.1 Work experience 
Hypothesis 1a: Managerial work experience in 
the top management team has a positive effect 
on academic spin-off performance.  
In line with literature, managerial 
work experience appears to have a substantial 
positive effect on ASO performance. Thus 
hypothesis 1a is weakly supported as the 
significance level is slightly above the 0.2 
limit. Furthermore, it was found that half of 
the ACEOs had managerial experience, giving 
room for variance in the sample. As seen in 
table 3 this type of experience correlates with 
VC. However, as we employed an average 
CEO we cannot say if this is because 
managerial experience attracts investors, or if 
investors require a change in CEO in order to 
get a CEO with managerial experience. 
Nonetheless, receiving VC correlates with 
CEO changes (significant at the 0.05 level), 
indicating that receiving VC leads to a change 
in CEO. Moreover, literature indicates that 
VCs look for ASOs with management 
experience in the TMT (Colombo and Grilli, 
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2010), indicating that both scenarios as 
presented above occur. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Technical work experience in 
the top management team has a positive effect 
on academic spin-off performance. 
Technical experience generates a p-
value of 0.5, meaning the relationship between 
technical experience and performance is 
random and inconclusive, thus the hypothesis 
is not supported. Furthermore, the OR 
indicates a negative effect (0.5). This is 
slightly contradicting with literature as we 
expected to find a clear positive effect, 
especially since our sample consists of high-
tech firms. Worth noting is the fact that most 
ACEOs in our sample (70%) have technical 
experience, meaning the variance in the 
variable is low, which may be the reason for 
the inconclusive results. Even though, the 
suggestion of ASOs needing technical 
experience may still apply, as the crucial type 
of technical experience may reside in other 
founders than the CEO.  
Furthermore, the high level of 
technical experience among our ACEOs may 
be an illustration of the original 
entrepreneurial team appointing external CEOs 
that have similar backgrounds to themselves or 
that the founders themselves become CEOs. 
On the one hand, a CEO with similar 
background may be positive, as it reduces 
cognitive distance and enhances the transfer of 
tacit knowledge (Knockaert et al., 2011, 
Zucker et al., 1999). On the other hand it may 
lead to group thinking and bad strategic 
decisions, as different viewpoints are not 
introduced and discussed (Buyl et al., 2011). 
Our model cannot be used to find support for 
these assumptions as it does not codify 
subjective and personal opinions of the 
individuals involved. If further investigated, a 
case study approach with in-depth interviews 
is suggested to be more appropriate.  
We also observe that 30% of the 
ACEOs lack technical experience, meaning no 
technical experience has ever been present in 
CEOs throughout the development of the 
ASO. This is worth a comment as this could be 
a reason for the insignificant and negative 
result. Assuming this is indeed the case, one 
could argue that the lack of technical 
experience of the CEO in very early stages of 
an ASO may lead to failure to find a suitable 
market for the technology. The CEO is 
arguably influential in strategic decisions, 
meaning the failure to comprehend the 
technology and its value offerings may be 
detrimental to firm development. Even though 
technical experience is suggested to become of 
lesser importance in later phases, early 
decisions have lasting effects on the firms 
performance, implying that poor decision 
making in early phases may limit future 
prospects of growth (Bamford et al., 2000). 
 
Hypothesis 1c: Commercial work experience 
in the top management team has a positive 
effect on academic spin-off performance  
Results regarding the effect of 
commercial experience are inconclusive as the 
p-value is well above the limit of significance 
(0.7). Hypothesis 1c is not supported. This is 
somewhat contradicting to the majority of 
existing literature which outlines commercial 
experience as a positive influence on ASO 
performance (Aspelund et al., 2005, Shane, 
2000, Park, 2005, Marvel and Lumpkin, 2007, 
Shrader and Siegel, 2007, Marvel, 2013), 
albeit more so when complemented with 
technical experience (Wright et al., 2007b, 
Ganotakis, 2012, Colombo and Grilli, 2005). 
Several factors may have lead to the failure to 
support the hypothesis; (i) If commercial 
experience was not complemented with 
technical experience, the commercial 
experience may not have had an impact. 
Arguably, having knowledge of technology 
increases the understanding of the scope of the 
business idea and raises the chances of 
recognising opportunities (ii) If the cognitive 
distance between technical roles and 
commercial roles was too large this may have 
hampered performance as this inhibits 
effective knowledge sharing (Nooteboom et 
al., 2007) (iii) If commercial experience was 
not present in initial phases, the team may 
have failed to recognise the best opportunities 
and markets (Bjerkholt et al. 2014 ) (iv) Even 
though general commercial experience is 
expected to have a positive effect, the lack of 
experience from the particular market where 
the spin-off operates may have produced 
insignificant result. Arguably commercial 
experience is expected to produce more 
significant results if the experience is industry-
specific. This is an interesting topic for further 
research.  
 
24 
Hypothesis 1d: Entrepreneurial work 
experience in the top management team has a 
positive effect on academic spin-off 
performance. 
The effect on entrepreneurial work 
experience is insignificant in our model as the 
p-value is 0.6. Hence, the hypothesis is not 
supported. Even though the result is 
inconclusive, the OR points in a negative 
direction. If the negative effect was to be 
significant, it is somewhat contradicting to 
previous literature, as we expected to see a 
positive effect on firm performance. A stream 
of literature does however point out that 
second time entrepreneurs may become 
overconfident and adopt strategies that have 
worked in the past (Santarelli and Hien Thu, 
2013). As ASOs operate in dynamic and 
rapidly changing environments (Unger et al., 
2011), second-time entrepreneurs should be 
just as eager to seek out new knowledge as 
challenges in a high tech venture are likely to 
be different from those of their previous firm. 
Hence, entrepreneurs should never rest on 
their laurels. Furthermore we also made 
observations that some CEOs with 
entrepreneurial experience were surrogate 
CEOs hired from TTOs and VC firms. We 
were given the impression that their role as a 
CEO was merely one of administrational and 
practical function and far from a full-time 
engagement as they would often work in the 
several startups at the same time. Arguably, 
this makes it difficult to take full advantage of 
their entrepreneurial experience resulting in 
divergence in our sample.  
5.2 Education 
Hypothesis 2a: Managerial education in the 
top management team has a positive effect on 
academic spin-off performance. 
In line with existing literature 
(Colombo and Grilli, 2009, Oakey, 2003, 
Ganotakis, 2012), managerial education is 
found to have a high impact on ASO 
performance. Hypothesis 2a is supported with 
a p-value of 0.04, thus with high significance. 
In fact, managerial education is the IV in the 
model with the strongest (measured by the 
OR) positive effect to predict ASO 
performance. It is surprising that managerial 
education has such a strong effect on 
performance compared to managerial work 
experience. A possibility is that the 
combination of education and experience has 
an effect on performance. In other words, the 
combination of management education and 
managerial work experience may exert a 
greater impact on ASO performance compared 
to technical education (or no education) 
combined with managerial work experience. 
This would explain why management 
education appears to have a stronger impact on 
performance compared to managerial work 
experience.  
Furthermore, the difference between 
managerial education and managerial 
experience may be due to the way the 
variables managerial education and 
managerial experience were measured. 
Managerial education includes business, 
managerial and economic educations. On the 
other hand, managerial experience measures 
previous experience in managing people (see 
3.3.2). It is possible that it is advantageous to 
have knowledge about businesses and 
economy, and that this explains why 
managerial education has a higher impact on 
ASO performance compared to managerial 
experience.  
Finally, as 86% of the ASOs have 
academic founders it is likely that the majority 
of ASOs have technical knowledge within the 
TMT. It is possible that positive synergy 
effects occur due to the coexistence of 
technical knowledge and managerial 
education. This is in line with literature 
emphasizing the importance of technical skills 
being balanced with managerial/business and 
commercial skills (Kakati, 2003, Oakey, 2003, 
Ganotakis, 2012, Gurdon and Samsom, 2010, 
Aspelund et al., 2005). 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Technical education in the top 
management team has no effect on academic 
spin-off performance 
The p-value of technical education’s impact on 
the performance of an ASO is too low (0.6) for 
us to say something conclusive. Accordingly, 
hypothesis H2b is not supported. Nonetheless, 
we will discuss the results assuming they are 
significant. In fact, the variable appears to 
have a positive impact on ASO performance. 
This is in line with Colombo and Grilli 
(2009)’s findings, which indicate that technical 
education has a limited, but positive impact on 
performance. However, 80% of all ACEOs 
had technical education in our dataset, which 
makes it difficult to draw conclusions on its 
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importance. It may be that CEOs with 
technical backgrounds are more likely to 
understand the technology, its limitations and 
possible applications. Furthermore, it may be 
that technical education in the TMT is 
particularly important in ASOs as early phase 
technical inventions are commercialised 
(Shane, 2004).  
 
Hypothesis 2c: PhDs within the top 
management team has a negative effect on 
academic spin-off performance. 
Hypothesis is not supported as it was found 
that those holding a PhD degree were in fact 
more likely to positively affect ASO 
performance. Furthermore, this can be said 
with moderate significance (p-value of 0.173). 
The results thus appear to be in opposition 
with previous studies, which give support for 
an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
education and ASO performance (Oakey, 
2003, Ganotakis, 2012, Unger et al., 2011, 
Gimmon, 2010), in which it is specified that 
higher education in the form of PhDs affect 
ASO performance negatively. While we do not 
test for an inverted U-shape, we are able to say 
that the endpoint (having higher education in 
the form of PhDs) of this relationship does not 
affect performance negatively, but rather 
positively. It may be that having high 
education at the PhD level gives credibility in 
the academic environment of an ASO, which 
again facilitates the access to resources in 
academic institutions as well as receiving 
governmental funding. In fact, Gimmon 
(2010) found that academic status in the form 
of holding a PhD increased the chances of 
receiving external investment. Since we have 
used average values for the CEOs we do not 
have the data to investigate if this is the case. 
However, we do know that receiving VC 
funding is positively and significantly 
correlated to performance.  
Furthermore, it should be noted that 
practically all of the PhDs in the sample were 
of technical character. In this way we have 
rather tested if technical PhDs, as opposed to 
general PhDs, have a negative effect on ASO 
performance. If other types of PhDs had been 
present in CEOs, for example social science 
PhDs, we believe that the positive effect on 
ASO performance might diminish. However, 
this belief is based on the assumption that most 
of the PhDs are held by academic founders 
that at some point in time hold the position as 
CEOs. Moreover, it assumes that the PhDs are 
closely related to the technology or research 
result being commercialized. It is important to 
emphasize that this is an assumption, so it 
needs to be investigated whether this link 
exist. However, as previously pointed out, 
Borlaug (2009) found that in 42% of the 
FORNY spin-offs, the founder was also the 
current CEO, thus indicating that our 
assumption might be true. This is an 
interesting area of further research.  
5.3 Academic founder 
Hypothesis 3a: Academic founders present in 
the top management team at the academic 
spin-off’s inception will have a positive effect 
on performance.  
Due to a p-value of 0.8 we are not able to 
investigate whether the presence of academic 
founders is advantageous for ASO 
performance, thus hypothesis 3a is not 
supported. As the significance is so low we 
cannot say anything conclusive, although the 
OR indicates that the presence of academic 
founders have little or no impact on ASO 
performance. Worth noting is the fact that the 
majority of the tracked ASOs had the 
academic founder present, making the impact 
of this variable in the model inconclusive. We 
were not able to uncover to what degree 
academic founders were committed to the 
spin-off, assuming that this would give a more 
conclusive result. However, if the academic 
founder possesses commercial experience, the 
data points to a positive and moderate effect 
on ASOs performance. This supports the 
literature stating that academic founders with 
commercial experience are more likely to 
build performing spin-offs (Franklin et al., 
2001). Founders with commercial experience 
are more likely to recognise commercial 
opportunities and the need to make products 
that are suited customer needs (Aspelund et 
al., 2005, Shane, 2000, Park, 2005, Marvel and 
Lumpkin, 2007, Shrader and Siegel, 2007, 
Marvel, 2013). Furthermore, when founders 
have experience in several areas, it is expected 
to reduce the cognitive distance in the TMT, 
acting as a bridge between the technical and 
commercial roles (Knockaert et al., 2011). 
Interestingly, we failed to find a 
positive effect of commercial experience (the 
results are inconclusive) on ASO performance. 
As stated in the discussion of those results, it 
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may be that cognitive distance between 
commercial and technical roles were too large. 
Arguably, if an individual has both 
commercial and technical experience, 
drawbacks of cognitive distance are overcome. 
Furthermore, the presence of technical and 
commercial experience in the earliest phases is 
argued to enhance performance. Our result 
appears to support this argumentation since we 
found that academic founders with commercial 
experience (coexistence of technical and 
commercial knowledge in the same person) 
present at ASO establishment (indicating an 
early phase) affect ASO performance 
positively.  
5.4 Other remarks 
Overall, when comparing results of education 
with those of work experience, there is a 
moderate indication that education has a 
stronger effect on performance compared to 
experience. Out of three education variables 
(technical, managerial and PhD), PhD and 
managerial education were among the 
variables that showed the most significant and 
positive effects.  
All experience variables, except 
managerial experience, produced insignificant 
results in the direction of a negative effect. It 
could be that the different types of experience 
prove valuable in certain phases of 
development and less in others. If this was 
true, this could be the reason why our results 
on experience are inconclusive as we did not 
identify at what point in time the various work 
experiences were introduced. 
Even though we are not able to extract 
supporting data, it could also be that too much 
work experience in early phases actually has 
an adverse effect on performance as it implies 
a higher age, less willingness to take risk and 
also a psychological commitment to the 
current situation, preventing them to take 
innovative risks (Hambrick and Mason, 1984, 
Colombo and Delmastro, 2002). Additionally, 
experienced individuals are likely to be 
accustomed to higher spendings, both 
professionally and in their private life. The 
former may imply the accumulation of higher 
expenses in the spin-off, thus draining 
resources. The latter indicates a dependency 
on monthly income, which the spin-off may be 
unable to support in the long run. Hence, 
experience present in later phases could be 
positively related to performance as the CEO 
will benefit from episodic learning from 
previous employments and a large network of 
contacts. Although the following is mere 
speculation and not supported in our dataset, 
newly graduated students have less 
obligations, are more willing to take risk and 
do not perceive the opportunity costs of not 
pursuing a paid job as high. Considering the 
Norwegian research context, this makes sense. 
Opportunity costs of quitting a well-paid job 
are high, the unemployment rate is 
significantly low5 and accordingly very few 
become entrepreneurs out of necessity. 
Nevertheless, it is certainly an interesting topic 
of debate and further research.  
6. CONCLUSION AND 
IMPLICATIONS 
Explaining why some ASOs perform better 
than others is an increasingly interesting topic 
of study and is valuable as it helps to 
understand how one can create better 
performing spin-offs. The research questions 
of this study relates to how, and to what 
extent, human capital of the TMT and how 
presence of the academic founder affects 
performance. By looking at human capital 
indicators like experience and education of the 
TMT, operationalized through the CEO, we 
were able to investigate relationships between 
human capital and performance.  
 Whereas most other studies are static 
and study firms by taking a snapshot in time, 
we consider how changes over time in the 
TMT affects performance. By calculating an 
ACEO value for each type of human capital 
for each ASO we were able to see which types 
of human capital that affect ASO performance 
positively on average. With regards to 
experience, we found weak support for 
managerial experience’s positive effect on 
ASO performance. Surprisingly, we found 
strong evidence that managerial education has 
the strongest positive effect on predicting ASO 
performance among all the variables that were 
tested. Furthermore, we found that the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/asd/topics/labour
-market-policy/arbeid_og_ledighet/arbeidsledighet-
2.html?id=86893 
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presence of PhD degrees has a positive effect 
on performance.  
As most ASOs are built upon the tacit 
knowledge of academic founders we also 
make a case for the study of the initial 
presence of the academic founder in the 
entrepreneurial team. While the results 
regarding the presence of an academic founder 
were inconclusive, we found that academic 
founders with commercial experience have a 
positive and significant effect on ASO 
performance.  
Our contribution is also related to our 
chosen dataset. In contrast to a number of 
other studies, we have looked at the context of 
Norwegian ASOs, suggesting that Western-
European spin-offs may exhibit other 
characteristics than those from US institutions, 
notably due to less developed high-tech 
environments and centers (Wright et al., 
2007b). Additionally, being based on 
consistent and comprehensive information of 
100 successful and failed Norwegian ASOs, it 
is arguably a unique and reliable dataset. By 
also taking failed ASOs into account, we 
prevented a survivor bias in our study.  
Our findings offer a number of 
practical implications for all parties involved 
in spin-off creation and development. In the 
following section we will introduce practical 
implications for entrepreneurs, investors, 
TTOs and policy makers. 
 
Entrepreneurs 
Managerial education in the TMT has a strong 
effect on ASO performance. Additionally, 
managerial work experience has a positive 
effect on performance. We suggest that 
entrepreneurs gain managerial knowledge, 
possible through taking an MBA. Alternatively 
they could benefit from choosing individuals 
with managerial knowledge when expanding 
the team.  
 
External investors 
For the case of external investors, it is seen 
that they typically favor team members with 
managerial and entrepreneurial experience 
(Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984). However, the 
results of our study indicate that also 
managerial education and PhD degrees affect 
performance positively. High technical 
education, in the form of a Phd, should not be 
underestimated as this may provide the ASO 
with the academic credibility necessary to 
obtain funds from governmental research 
grants and other resources from the research 
institution. Furthermore, the presence at ASO 
inception of academic founders with 
commercial experience appears to be a good 
predictor of high performance, and as such, 
should be emphasised by investors.  
TTOs 
As academic entrepreneurs with commercial 
knowledge have a positive effect on ASO 
performance, TTOs could contribute through 
focusing even more on the commercial aspects 
of spin-off development through coaching 
academic entrepreneurs. Hence, TTOs could 
contribute to raising academic founders’ 
commercial awareness and help them develop 
a commercial mindset.  
 
Policy makers 
The strong relationship between managerial 
education and performance deserves some 
attention. Even though the relationship is 
likely to be affected by a combination of 
managerial education and some kind of work 
experience, we argue that people with 
managerial education regardless of experience 
may be a source of valuable input to an ASO. 
As research commercialization activity is 
primarily the work of technical universities 
and other research institutions, pure business 
schools are less likely to be involved in this 
kind of activity. We suggest business schools 
and technical research institutions form 
stronger bonds so that (i) business school 
graduates can become more involved in spin-
off activity and complement the skills of 
technical entrepreneurs (ii) Practical and 
research related knowledge from business 
school environments can become of use to 
ASOs.  
 7. LIMITATIONS AND 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
While we have aimed at conducting a 
representative study, it is not without 
limitations. We encourage others to address 
these limitations. Accordingly, we will suggest 
some areas for further research.  
Longitudinal panel study: Ideally, a 
longitudinal panel study should have been 
used to test the hypothesis in this article. This 
type of study may have helped in 
understanding when the different types of 
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human capital enhance ASO performance. 
These types of studies are based on 
observations that usually span several years. 
As this is outside of the scope of this master 
thesis we were unable to do so. However, we 
do suggest that others research when the 
different types of human capital are needed.  
Interaction effects: Interaction effects 
from different combinations of the 
independent variables were not tracked, as 
described in 3.4. This could have further 
enriched the regression model, and enabled us 
to do an even more extensive discussion of the 
results. The choice of using an ACEO in the 
regression model made it very difficult to 
include interaction effects in the model, and 
this is the reason why these effects were left 
out of this study. Replicating our study while 
taking interaction effects into consideration is 
an interesting area of further research.  
 Weighting the variables: As indicated 
in 3.4, the use of binary variables poses some 
limitations. We encourage others to investigate 
how the use of continuous variables might 
affect the results of this study. We think that 
adjusting for the number of years of previous 
work experience of a CEO might influence the 
results, as experience is gained over time. 
Furthermore, a weighting of the variables with 
regards to the ranking of the educational 
institution where the education of the CEO 
originate from may impact the results (as 
explained in 3.4), and adjusted for.  
 Larger sample: Some of our results 
had elevated p-values and small variance in 
the samples, making the results inconclusive. 
However, assuming that the results had been 
conclusive, some of these results indicated that 
the hypotheses were wrong. Specifically, it 
appears that technical, commercial and 
entrepreneurial work experience may have a 
negative impact on ASO performance. While 
our sample of 100 firms is large enough to 
perform logistic regression, the validness of 
the results should be tested in larger samples. 
It would be interesting to see if the results of 
the analysis would have been different if we 
had performed them on the entire database of 
FORNY spin-offs. Additionally, it would be of 
interest to investigate the extent to which the 
context affects the results. Similar studies 
could be performed in other countries to verify 
the applicability of the results in an 
international context.  
 Study the entire TMT: Our findings are 
based on data focused on one individual 
namley the CEO, arguably the most influential 
person in the entire ASO. However recently 
other scholars have argued that most new 
ventures are started by teams, not individuals 
and that these teams take decisions together 
thus making the team and not the individual 
the most integral part of the performance of 
the ASO (Klotz et al., 2014). Thus, our 
operationalization of the TMT through the 
CEO poses a limitation that may affect our 
results. It is probable that some of the 
measures of human capital we tested for is 
present in other members of the TMT. Hence, 
replicating the study by looking at the whole 
TMT might influence the results, and we 
encourage others to do this.  
 Effect of technical PhDs: We had a 
surprising result with regards to the effect of 
PhD degrees in the TMT as we found that such 
presence has a positive impact on ASO 
performance. As this partly contradicts 
previous literature it should be further 
investigated. Furthermore, as most of the PhDs 
in our samples were of a technical character, it 
should be investigated whether the distinction 
between a technical and general (other than 
technical) PhD degree is the reason for this 
result.  
 Education: Surprisingly, we found 
indications that education may have a more 
positive impact on performance compared to 
work experience. As previously discussed, this 
may be due to some attributes associated with 
work experience (for example a higher age). 
This may indicate that inexperienced 
individuals that come straight out of the 
university are better suited to run an ASO in 
its earlier phases. We strongly encourage 
others to research this topic to test if this can 
be true.  
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